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INTRODUCTION
As a matter of statutory law, 1 a Delaware corporation is managed and
supervised by its board of directors. 2 As a matter of judge-made law
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1. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2009). This section provides, in pertinent part:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall
be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If any
such provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties
conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be
exercised or performed to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be
provided in the certificate of incorporation.
§ 141(a).
The managerial functions of directors can be divided into two broad areas: decision-making
and supervision. In its decision-making role, the board determines matters of policy and
makes the large decisions that chart the corporation’s future. “Legally, the board itself [is]
required to authorize the most significant corporate acts or transactions: mergers, changes
in capital structure, fundamental changes in business, appointment and compensation of the
CEO, etc.” In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996).
In its supervisory function, the board monitors those assigned to carry out its decisions. Id.
at 968.
2. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (holding that actions of
the board, meeting certain criteria, will be evaluated under the lenient 'business judgment'
standard of review); In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 363 (Del. Ch. 2008)
(stating that shareholders challenging a merger must first confront the business judgment
rule); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 19 (Del. Ch. 2002) (citing the business judgment rule
as a recognition of the precept that the board manages the business and affairs of the
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derived from traditional principles of equity, directors perform these
statutory duties subject to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. 3 The
duty of loyalty requires directors to be guided by a reasonable belief that
their actions will serve the best interests of the corporation and its
stockholders. 4 The duty of care requires directors to act in an informed and
deliberate manner. 5 This article focuses on judicial review of the board’s
performance of these duties in the context of approving business
combinations 6 between the board’s corporation and another corporation, an
area largely governed by the Revlon doctrine. 7
Traditionally, judicial review of a board’s decision to approve a
business combination is governed by the business judgment rule. 8 That
rule prevents the court from reviewing the substantive merits of the
decision unless the plaintiff can show that a majority of the decisionmaking directors lacked impartiality or failed to exercise due care. 9 In
recent years, that has changed. Under current Delaware law, if a business
combination is deemed to constitute a “sale of the company” 10 or a “sale of
corporation).
3. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del.
1986). The Delaware General Corporation Law does not define directors’ duties to the
corporation or its shareholders. Rather, it leaves these duties to be defined under traditional
principles of equity by the judges of the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court
of Chancery.
4. See Cede & Co., Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (stating
that this interest “takes precedence over any interest possessed by a director . . . and not
shared by the stockholders generally.”).
5. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del 1985).
6. The term “business combinations” is used in this article to refer to transactions by
which two corporations combine their assets and liabilities to create a single business entity.
This can be accomplished in a single step by a long-form merger or in two steps by an
agreed upon tender offer followed by a long- or short-form merger. A business combination
may be deemed the acquisition of one corporation by another or a merger of equals.
7. The Delaware courts are a little inconsistent in their use of this label. The Delaware
Supreme Court used it in Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1084 (Del. 2001), and the
Court of Chancery used it in In re Lear Corp. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 115 (Del. Ch.
2007) and In re Cysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 546 (Del. Ch. 2003). On the
other hand, the Delaware Supreme Court has said that the use of such colloquial labels in
judicial proceedings is inappropriate. Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d
1270, 1289 n.40 (Del. 1994); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon,
Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the
End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. LAW. 1593, 1593-4 (1994) (noting the inappropriateness of
such colloquialisms as “Revlon duties” and “Revlon-land” in judicial proceedings).
8. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73; Cede, 634 A.2d at 363.
9. See Mills Acqisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del.1988)
(“[W]hen a court reviews a board action, challenged as a breach of duty, it should decline to
evaluate the wisdom and merits of a business decision unless sufficient facts are alleged
with particularity, or the record otherwise demonstrates, that the decision was not the
product of an informed, disinterested, and independent board.”).
10. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (involving a sale of the company).
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control” 11 it is governed by the Revlon doctrine. That doctrine makes two
important changes. First, the board’s fiduciary duties are no longer focused
on the long-term well-being of the corporation. Instead, its duties are
aimed at serving the short-term interests of the stockholders in achieving a
transaction that will maximize the immediate value of their shares. 12 These
refocused duties are sometimes referred to as “Revlon duties”. 13 Second, if
the board’s performance of these “Revlon duties” is challenged, the court
will not defer to the board’s business judgment, even though the board’s
independence, disinterestedness, and diligence would have earned such
deference under the business judgment rule. 14 Instead, the court will
review the decision with “enhanced scrutiny,” a procedure that requires
independent, disinterested directors to prove 15 : (1) that their decisionmaking process was performed with adequate care; 16 and (2) that their
decision was reasonable under the circumstances. 17
In Part I, this article will explain the Revlon doctrine. Part II will
focus on Revlon duties. The article will argue that the original Revlon
decision correctly recognized that, in deciding whether to approve a
business combination, the board’s fiduciary duties must be focused
exclusively on the welfare of stockholders. But, subsequent applications of
the holding in Revlon, which allowed a board to pursue a pending
transaction in the face of an alternative transaction that would better serve
the stockholders’ interests provided that the pending transaction does not
involve a “change of control,” 18 are mistaken. The fact that a transaction
will cause a change of control merely creates the opportunity to seek a
control premium, an element of value that is intended to compensate the

11. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 36 (Del.
1994) (involving the sale of control).
12. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (stating that when the break-up of a company is
inevitable, the board’s duty changes from preserving the company “to the maximization of
the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit”).
13. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 928 (Del. 2003); Paramount
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
14. Employing a bit of linguistic sleight of hand, the court often says that they subject
the transaction to enhanced scrutiny before they accord the transaction the favorable
presumption of the business judgment rule. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45. But, this puts things
backwards. The business judgment rule is a rule that prevents courts from examining the
merits of the challenged transaction. See infra Part III.
15. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 931 (“‘[T]he directors have the burden of proving that they
were adequately informed and acted reasonably.’” (quoting QVC, 637 A.2d at 45)).
16. Id. This inquiry focuses on the quality of the information and advice available to
the directors and the care with which they reached their decision.
17. Id. This inquiry necessarily involves an examination of the substantive merits of
the board’s decision because it asks whether the challenged decision was reasonably likely
to enhance the price the corporation’s stockholders would receive for their shares.
18. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43 (Del. 1994).
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stockholders who will sacrifice control. 19 This paper will argue that the
board’s duty as an agent for the stockholders requires it to consider other
offers that may arise before the pending deal is consummated. Even when
the pending deal is a stock-for-stock merger of equals, the board’s duty as
the stockholders’ agent requires it to determine whether an alternative
proposal would be of greater value to stockholders than the present value of
the resulting corporation’s long-term prospects. If the alternative proposal
is better, the board’s duty as the stockholders’ agent would prevent it from
recommending that the stockholders accept the less valuable pending
deal. 20
Part III of this article will examine the business judgment rule. Part
IV traces the origins and evolution of enhanced scrutiny and concludes that
enhanced scrutiny differs dramatically from the business judgment rule in
two respects. First, under the business judgment rule, the burden is on the
plaintiff to show that the directors failed to satisfy their duty of care. 21
Enhanced scrutiny has relieved the plaintiff of that burden, and instead
requires the directors to prove that they followed an adequate decisionmaking process, a proof that amounts to showing their compliance with
their duty of care. Second, under the business judgment rule, the court will
not review the substantive merits of the challenged decision made by
impartial directors who acted with due care. But, under enhanced scrutiny,
the court will review the substance of the challenged decision to make sure
it is “reasonable.” 22
Parts V and VI will show that courts apply enhanced scrutiny liberally
in actions for injunctive relief but not in actions for damages. Part VII
concludes with an argument for a return to the business judgment rule’s
policy favoring judicial deference to business decisions made by objective
and diligent boards and argues that enhanced scrutiny is only appropriate
where the circumstances suggest that the board’s decision to approve a
particular transaction may have been influenced by factors irrelevant to the
19. Id.
20. See ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 97 (Del. Ch. 1999) (declining to
enjoin stockholders from terminating a merger agreement because the harm to the
company’s stockholders outweighed the harm suffered by the company seeking the
injunction).
21. Cede, 634 A.2d at 361; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 889.
22. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 931 (citing QVC, 637 A.2d at 45); see also Unitrin, Inc. v.
Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1385-86 (Del. 1995) (noting that the court does not
demand that the directors’ decision be the best one; rather, it merely requires that the
decision be within a range of reasonable choices). In QVC the court candidly admitted that
this required judges to review “the substantive merits of a board’s actions.” QVC, 637 A.2d
at 45. But see Paul L. Regan, The Unimportance of Being Earnest: Paramount Rewrites
the Rules for Enhanced Scrutiny in Corporate Takeovers, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 125, 127 (1994)
(arguing that Paramount's formulation of the test for enhanced judicial scrutiny represents
an unwarranted intrusion into the managerial authority of the board of directors).
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best interests of the stockholders.
I.

THE TWO ELEMENTS OF THE REVLON DOCTRINE

Two important consequences flow from the determination that a
transaction is governed by the Revlon doctrine. 23 First, the focus of the
board’s fiduciary duties shifts from the long-term well-being of the
corporation to the short-term interests of the stockholders in achieving a
transaction that will maximize the value of their shares. 24 These refocused
duties are frequently referred to as Revlon duties. 25 Second, the Court will
subject the board’s performance of its Revlon duties to enhanced scrutiny,
even though, under the business judgment rule, the decision would be
entitled to judicial deference. 26
Delaware’s jurisprudence in this area has tended to conflate these two
distinct aspects of the Revlon doctrine. As a result, the two concepts have
become congruent. 27 When a transaction involves circumstances that shift
the board’s duties to the short-term interests of stockholders, the court will
subject the board’s decision to enhanced scrutiny. 28
But, not all
circumstances that call for shifting the focus of the board’s duties justify
departure from the business judgment rule’s policy of favoring judicial
deference to business decisions that have been carefully made by impartial
directors. Conversely, not all circumstances that call for enhanced scrutiny
involve circumstances that require the board to focus solely on the
stockholders’ short-term interests.
This article will address these two elements separately.
II.

DUTY-SHIFTING

A.

The Revlon Case
In the now famous Revlon case, 29 the court reviewed a decision by

23. See supra note 8 for a discussion of the Delaware courts’ inconsistent use of this
label.
24. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 (Del. 1989)
(“MacMillan II”); see also QVC, 637 A.2d at 44 (“In the sale of control context, the
directors must focus on one primary objective- to secure the transaction offering the best
value reasonably available for the stockholders- and they must exercise their fiduciary duties
to further that end.”).
25. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 921; Time, 571 A.2d at 1150.
26. MacMillan II, 559 A.2d at 1287-88 ; In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94,
115 n.19 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Topps Co. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 93 n.31 (Del. Ch.
2007).
27. See Regan, supra note 23, at 181-85.
28. In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holder Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 705 (Del. Ch. 2001).
29. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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Revlon’s board to “sell the company” 30 to a white knight, Forstmann-Little
& Co. 31 The sale was intended to block Pantry Pride’s bid to acquire
control of Revlon. 32 Pantry Pride responded to the white knight deal by
increasing the price of its all-cash, all-shares offer and announcing that it
would engage in fractional bidding to top any price offered by ForstmannLittle. 33 Revlon’s directors, unwilling to see their company fall into the
hands of Pantry Pride, modified the agreement with Forstmann-Little to
raise its price slightly above Pantry Pride’s latest offer and to insert certain
deal protection measures that would create a financial deterrent to a higher
bid by Pantry Pride. 34 Undaunted, Pantry Pride made a higher offer,
contingent on the removal of the deal protection measures. 35 At the same
time, Pantry Pride brought an action in Delaware’s Court of Chancery
seeking an injunction against enforcement of the deal protection measures.
Pantry Pride argued that the board’s approval of these deal protection
measures violated its fiduciary duties to Revlon’s stockholders because
these measures prevented Revlon’s stockholders from accepting Pantry
Pride’s financially superior offer. 36
The court held that the board’s decision to “sell the company” meant
“[t]he duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon
as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale
for the stockholders’ benefit.” 37 As a consequence, the directors were no
longer “defenders of the corporate bastion;” but had become “auctioneers
charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company.” 38 Because the deal protection measures prevented Revlon’s
stockholders from accepting Pantry Pride’s superior offer, they were
inconsistent with the board’s duty to maximize the immediate value of their
shares. 39
Revlon recognized that when a board undertakes to negotiate a “sale of

30. Id. at 182 (noting that the authority given by the board to management to negotiate
“a merger or buy-out with a third party was a recognition that the company was for sale”).
31. Id. at 183 (noting that Forstmann-Little was acting as a “white knight”).
32. Id. at 175.
33. Id. at 178.
34. Id. at 178-79. The revised agreement included, among other things, the following:
(1) A “lock-up” option that gave Forstmann-Little the right to purchase one of Revlon’s
“crown jewel” divisions at a significantly discounted price (approximately 80% of value) if
Pantry Pride acquired more than 40% of Revlon’s shares; (2) A “no-shop” provision that
would prevent Revlon’s directors from seeking higher priced bids; and (3) A “cancellation
fee” of $25 million to be placed in escrow and paid to Forstmann-Little if Revlon terminated
the agreement. Id.
35. Id. at 179.
36. Id. at 182.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 176.
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the company,” 40 the focus of the board’s fiduciary duties shifts from
serving the well-being of the corporation to serving the stockholders
interest in maximizing the immediate value of their shares. 41 The problem
has been to define with greater precision the circumstances that require a
board to focus its duties exclusively on the immediate maximization of
shareholder value. 42 The issue is important because once it is determined
that a transaction has the effect invoking “Revlon duties” the board must
“treat all other interested acquirers on an equal basis.” 43 Thus, a board that
is subject to Revlon duties has no principled basis for rejecting an
unsolicited, higher priced third-party offer. 44 This can create a practical
problem for a board that believes that a business combination with a
particular corporation would be in their corporation’s best long-term
interests. If agreeing to such a business combination is deemed by a court
to have invoked Revlon duties, an unsolicited offer at a higher price may
force the board to abandon those plans to allow the company’s stockholders
to maximize the immediate value of their shares. 45
B.

Time-Warner’s Definition of When Revlon Governs

In Time-Warner, 46 the Delaware Supreme Court attempted to
narrowly define the circumstances that would invoke Revlon duties. The
dispute in that case began when Time, Inc. and Warner Communications,
Inc., agreed to combine their two companies in a stock-for-stock “merger

40. Id. at 182.
41. Id.
42. The circumstances that invoke “Revlon duties” are sometimes referred to as
“Revlon land”. In re NCS Healthcare, Inc. S’holders Litig., 825 A.2d 240, 262 (Del. Ch.
2002); McMillin v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 502 (Del. Ch. 2000); Ace Ltd. v.
Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 107 (Del. Ch. 1999). It is mildly interesting that the ViceChancellors used this colloquialism in their judicial opinions subsequent to the Supreme
Court’s admonition against their use.
43. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149 (Del. 1989).
44. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (holding that directors must maximize shareholder
profit when a company’s breakup is inevitable); QVC, 637 A.2d at 44 (Del. 1994) (stating
that the directors’ primary responsibility in the sale of control context is maximizing
shareholder value).
45. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 47 (holding that the board’s fiduciary duties to stockholders
prevented it from locking up a pending deal that would effectuate a change of control when
a better deal was potentially available); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 919-920 (Del.
2000) (finding Revlon duties were implicated where the board agreed to sell the entire
company even though the merger would not cause a change of control).
46. 571 A.2d at 1140. The decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware in this case is
commonly referred to as the “Time-Warner” decision because the challenged transactions
addressed by the court involved the merger of Time, Inc. with Warner Communications,
Inc. Id.
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‘of equals.’” 47 The stockholders of each corporation would become
stockholders of the resulting corporation and would, therefore, participate
in the long-term benefits to be achieved by the merger. The stock of both
companies was publicly traded, as would be the stock of the resulting
corporation. 48
Shortly before the special stockholders meeting at which Time’s
stockholders were to vote on the merger, Paramount, in an effort to prevent
Warner, its competitor in the entertainment industry, from gaining the
competitive advantage it would achieve by merging with Time, made an
unsolicited, all-cash tender offer to acquire Time. 49 Paramount’s offer was
priced well above the current trading price of Time’s stock. 50 Time’s
board, realizing that its stockholders would vote against the merger because
they preferred the more valuable Paramount cash offer, asked Warner to
restructure the transaction to avoid the necessity of a shareholder vote, and
Warner agreed. 51
Paramount and Time stockholders brought suit arguing, among other
things, that the original Time-Warner merger would constitute a “sale of
the company.” By approving this transaction, they argued, Time’s
directors had taken on Revlon duties which required them to allow Time’s
stockholders to accept Paramount’s more valuable tender offer. 52 The
Delaware Supreme Court rejected that argument because the Time-Warner
merger did not fit within any of the circumstances that had thus far
implicated Revlon duties. 53
Unfortunately, the court did not provide a principled analysis of a
legal doctrine or policy that would require the directors to shift the focus of
their fiduciary duties from serving the best interests of the corporation to
seeking a transaction that would maximize the immediate value of the
company’s shares. Instead, the Court merely described some of the facts of
the three 54 cases 55 in which Revlon duties had been held to be applicable.
47. Id. at 1145.
48. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, and 10935, 1989
WL 79880, at *8 (Del. Ch. 1989) (describing the stock-for-stock nature of the merger
between the two companies).
49. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1147.
50. Id. Paramount initially offered to acquire all of Time’s stock at $175 in cash. Id.
Paramount subsequently raised its offer to $200 per share. Id. at 1149. The trading price of
Time’s shares immediately before Paramount announced its offer was $126 per share. Id. at
1147.
51. Id. at 1148. Under the restructured transaction, Time would make a highly
leveraged tender offer to acquire just over fifty percent of Warner’s stock and then combine
the two companies in a second-step merger in which the consideration would be cash and
debt securities. Id.
52. Id. at 1149.
53. Id. at 1150-51.
54. Id. In its opinion, the court said there were two such circumstances, but it actually
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These cases involved the “breakup of the corporation,” 56 the
“reorganization of the corporation,” 57 and an effort to sell the corporation at
auction 58 .
1.

Breakup of the Corporation

The first 59 of the three circumstances identified in Time-Warner
occurs when the board decides, in response to a takeover bid, to abandon
the corporation’s “long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction
involving the breakup of the company.” 60 In support of this, the court cites
its earlier decision in Revlon. 61 The court explains that the directors’ duties
shifted because they approved a “‘bust-up’ sale of assets in a leveraged
acquisition.” 62
The court’s emphasis on the buyer’s use of leverage to finance the
acquisition and the buyer’s plans to sell certain corporate assets to help pay
off the debt may have resonated with critics of takeovers who decried the
“bust-up” culture of corporate America in the 1980s, but it does not provide
a principled reason to explain why a board’s duty would shift from longterm planning for the benefit of the corporation to short-term value
maximization for the benefit of the shareholders. The fact that an acquirer
uses borrowed money to purchase a corporation’s stock is irrelevant to the
stockholder who receives cash in exchange for his shares. To the
stockholder, borrowed cash is the same as earned cash. Similarly, the fact
that the acquirer may sell off corporate assets to repay part of the debt is
also irrelevant to the stockholders. When the acquisition is complete, the
stockholders will no longer have an equity interest in the corporation. The
corporation will belong to the acquirer, who will thus have the right to
dispose of its assets as it pleases. Neither the source of the acquirer’s
financing nor its post-acquisition plans for the corporation provides a
principled reason to require directors to focus their duties exclusively on
the immediate maximization of shareholder value. Indeed, if anything, an

described three. Id.
55. The cases concerned are: Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Macmillan I, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988), and Macmillan II,
559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
56. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. The order in which these are presented is the reverse of the order in which the court
discussed them. This order was chosen because it follows the chronological sequence of
judicial decisions from which the examples are taken.
60. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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acquirer’s plans to breakup the company would only be relevant in a
circumstance where the board’s fiduciary duties were focused on the longterm welfare of the company.
2.

Reorganization of the Corporation

The second circumstance identified in the Time-Warner decision
occurs when a corporation initiates “a business reorganization involving a
clear break-up of the company.” 63 In support of this, the court cites
MacMillan II. 64 That case involved the first chapter in the saga involving
Macmillan Corporation’s efforts to defend itself from hostile takeover bids.
The saga began when the board of MacMillan responded to an unsolicited
takeover bid by approving a reorganization plan that would divide the
company into two separate corporations. 65 One corporation would contain
MacMillan’s information business; the other corporation would contain its
publishing business. MacMillan’s shareholders would receive shares in
each corporation, and MacMillan’s senior managers would end up owning
a controlling block of stock in each. 66
At the time of the board’s decision, MacMillan’s financial advisors
estimated that the company was worth between $72.57 and $80 per share. 67
After restructuring, shares would be worth $64.15, 68 a value that was less
than the $73 per share takeover bid. 69 The Court of Chancery held that the
board’s duties in this circumstance were defined by Unocal and Revlon. 70
Because the restructuring prevented MacMillan’s shareholders from
accepting the more valuable takeover bid, the court concluded that the
board had violated its Unocal duties, and thus by implication, its Revlon
duties. 71
The Time-Warner decision offers no explanation of why the
reorganization of a corporation into separate corporations would impose an
obligation on directors to maximize the immediate value of the
corporation’s shares. Indeed, corporations are usually reorganized to
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing MacMillan II, 559 A.2d 1261). For an explanation of the “break-up”
transaction, see MacMillan I, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988).
65. MacMillan I, 552 A.2d at 1234-35.
66. Id. at 1236-37.
67. Id. at 1236.
68. Id. Other financial advisors opined that the value of the restructuring was between
sixty-three and sixty-eight dollars per share. Id.
69. Id. at 1237.
70. Id. at 1238.
71. Id. at 1238-39. The Chancellor explained that the reorganization was not a
reasonable response to the Bass Brothers’ takeover bid because it was worth less than the
Bass Brothers’ offer and it allowed the inside managers of MacMillan to acquire control of
the desirable information business without paying a takeover premium. Id. at 1241-44.
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improve their long-term prospects.
3.

Auction for the Company

The third circumstance occurs “when a corporation initiates an active
bidding process seeking to sell itself.” 72 In support of this, the court cites
MacMillan II. 73 MacMillan II dealt with the second and final chapter in the
MacMillan saga. After the Court of Chancery enjoined the proposed
restructuring, the MacMillan board decided to hold an auction and sell the
corporation to the highest bidder. 74 At the end of the auction, the board
approved a leveraged buyout by a group led by Macmillan’s senior
management. 75 The unsuccessful bidder challenged the board’s decision.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s holding that
the sale to the management leveraged-buyout group violated Revlon
because the auction had been corrupted to favor the management group and
thus denied stockholders a higher bid that would have been available had
the auction been run fairly. 76
This makes sense. Like any auctioneer, the Macmillan board owed its
fiduciary duties to the owners of the property being sold. That duty
required the board to get the highest available price. 77 The owners of the
corporation are the stockholders. So, of course, the board’s fiduciary duty
as an auctioneer required it to conduct the auction in a way that would
achieve the best available deal for the stockholders.
C.

Ownership Decisions Invoke Revlon Duties.

The noted corporate commentator, Bayless Manning, 78 adopted a
distinction between board decisions that involve “enterprise” issues and
those that involve “ownership” issues as a way of identifying
circumstances in which the Delaware courts would be willing to deviate
from the business judgment rule’s principle of judicial deference and
examine the merits of a board’s decision. 79 That distinction also provides a

72. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150.
73. Id.
74. MacMillan II, 559 A.2d at 1272.
75. Id. at 1277-78.
76. Id. at 1282-84.
77. Id. at 1282.
78. Professor Manning served as a Professor of Law at Yale, as Dean of Stanford Law
School, as executive director of the Council on Foreign Relations, and as a member of the
New York law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. See Yale Law School’s
Center
for
the
Study
of
Corporate
Law,
available
at
http://www.law.yale.edu/cbl/modernera.htm (last visited January 23, 2009).
79. See Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom
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useful way to identify the circumstances that require the board to focus its
fiduciary duties on the maximization of immediate shareholder value.
“Enterprise” issues are raised by questions having to do with the
ongoing operation of the corporation. A board decision to expand the
corporation’s business into a new geographic market would be an example
of an “enterprise” decision. 80 “Ownership” issues, on the other hand, arise
when the matter to be decided will directly affect the stockholders’
ownership interest in the corporation. 81 In Manning’s words, these issues
are raised by transactions that “hit [the stockholder] directly in his role as
an ‘owner,’ not ‘owner of the corporation’ as legal doctrine would have it,
but owner of his own reified piece of property, his share of stock.” 82 A
cash-for-stock merger, which converts the shares of stock owned by the
corporation’s stockholders into cash, is an example of such a transaction.
When considering an enterprise issue, the directors’ duties are focused
on serving the best interests of the corporation. But, when considering an
ownership issue, one that will affect the stockholders’ property interest in
the corporation’s shares, the directors’ duties should be focused on the best
interests of the stockholders, and that interest is served by maximizing the
value of their property, the corporation’s shares.
1.

Termination of Stockholders’ Equity Participation

The board’s duty to achieve the best available price for the shares held
by the corporation’s stockholders is clearest in the context of a transaction
that involves a “sale of the company,” the type of transaction at issue in the
Revlon case. The colloquialism “sale of the company,” refers to a business
combination that has the effect of terminating the stockholders’ equity
participation in their corporation. This can be accomplished by a merger in
which the stockholders’ shares are canceled and the stockholders receive
cash or non-equity securities in consideration for their cancelled shares, 83
or it can also be accomplished by a two-step process that begins with a
After Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1, 6 (1985) (distinguishing “ownership” decisions from
“enterprise” decisions—ownership decisions involve choices that involve selling one’s own
property or someone else’s property, which would require the owner’s permission).
80. Id. at 6 (describing various examples of enterprise decisions); see also Regan, supra
note 23, at 195 (reviewing the distinction between enterprise and ownership decisions and
providing examples of enterprise decisions); E. Norman Veasey, The New Incarnation of the
Business Judgment Rule in Takeover Defenses, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 503, 505 (1986)
(discussing enterprise decisions).
81. See Manning, supra note 80, at 6 (describing ownership decisions); see also Regan,
supra note 23, at 195 (same).
82. Manning, supra note 80, at 5-6.
83. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 866-67 (Del. 1985) (outlining a
leveraged buyout by management in a cash-out merger); McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768
A.2d 492, 496 (Del. Ch. 2000) (discussing the share price offered in a cash-out merger).
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tender offer to acquire the company’s shares in consideration of cash or
non-equity securities and ends with a squeeze-out merger in which any
remaining shares are eliminated for cash or non-equity securities. 84
The transaction in Revlon invoked the board’s duty to maximize the
immediate value of the stockholders’ shares because it would terminate the
stockholders’ equity participation in the company. The board was
negotiating the terms of a merger in which stockholders would receive cash
in exchange for their shares. 85 This put the board in a position in which it
was required to function like an agent selling articles of personal property,
the shares of the corporation’s stock, which belonged to its principals, the
corporation’s stockholders. Like any agent, a board in such a situation
owes its principals fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. 86 The duty of
loyalty requires the board to achieve the best available price for the
stockholders’ shares. The duty of care requires it to be informed of all
reasonably available relevant information and to exercise reasonable care in
its decision-making throughout the sales process.
Because the transaction will terminate the shareholders’ equity
participation, it marks their last chance to profit from their investment in
the corporation. 87 The fact that the business combination might achieve
some long-term benefit for the corporation is, to its stockholders, irrelevant.
For them, there will be no tomorrow. 88 Accordingly, in the context of a
sale of the company, (i.e., a transaction that terminates the stockholders’
equity participation in the enterprise) long-term benefits to be achieved by
the merger are unimportant to the stockholders. Because the board is
functioning as the agent of the stockholders, it must focus exclusively on
the immediate maximization of shareholder value.
2.

Stock-Swap Transactions

A transaction that constitutes the sale of the company is different from
a business combination in which the stockholders of the constituent
corporations will receive stock in the combined business entity. Such a
combination can be accomplished by a merger in which the stockholders’
shares are converted into shares of the resulting corporation. 89 It can also
84. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 40 (Del.
1994) (describing a two-step merger).
85. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
86. It is for this reason that a Revlon claim can be brought as a direct cause of action
rather than as a derivative action. Gatz v. Ponsoldt, No. 174-N, 2004 WL 3029868, at *7
(Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2004).
87. McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d 1012, 1032 (Del. Ch. 2004).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 63-65 (Del. 1995)
(describing merger negotiations involving various ratios of stock to be exchanged for shares
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be accomplished by a two-step process that begins with a tender offer in
which the offeror seeks to exchange shares of the resulting corporation for
the stockholders’ shares and ends with a squeeze-out merger in which any
remaining shares are cancelled and the holders receive shares of the
resulting corporation in exchange. 90 The significant difference between a
stock-swap transaction and a sale of the company is that, in the stock-swap
transaction, the stockholders will have an ongoing equity participation in
the entity into which the businesses were combined.
a.

Merger of Equals

A stock-swap transaction between two publicly traded corporations is
justified by the shared belief of the boards of the constituent corporations
that the shareholders of their respective corporations will be better off, in
the long term, as stockholders of the resulting corporation. 91 If not, there
would be no reason to enter into the transaction. To reach this conclusion,
each board must have reason to believe that the long-term prospects of the
combined entity are more promising than those of their respective
corporations as stand-alone entities. Thus, a stock-swap transaction can be
viewed as a tool by which to accomplish a long-term business plan. 92
To allow boards to pursue such long-term plans, courts have held that
a stock-swap between equals does not impose Revlon duties on the boards
of the constituent corporations. 93 Chancellor Allen first established this
point in Time-Warner. 94 Paramount had argued that Time’s board was
subject to Revlon’s short-term, value-maximizing imperative because it
approved a stock-swap merger with Warner. 95 Paramount argued that this
imperative required Time’s board to compare the estimated present value
of the proposed Time-Warner transaction against the cash value of

in the merged company).
90. See, e.g., QVC, 34 A.2d 637 (Del. 1994). In that case, the challenged transaction, a
business combination between Viacom and Paramount, began as a stock-swap merger and
was restructured into a tender offer by Viacom for Paramount stock to be followed by a
squeeze out merger. The restructuring was in response to a competitive bid for Paramount
by QVC. Both forms of the challenged transaction, merger and two-step process were
intended to achieve the same result—the combination of the business of Viacom and
Paramount.
91. See, e.g., Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150 (“[The Board has the] authority to set a
corporate course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate
profitability. Thus, the question of ‘long-term’ versus ‘short-term’ values is largely
irrelevant . . . .”).
92. Id. at 1151-52.
93. Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 71.
94. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, and 10935, 1989 WL
79880, at *22 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989).
95. Id. at *21.
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Paramount’s tender offer, and abandon the proposed merger if it was worth
less than Paramount’s tender offer. 96
The Chancellor rejected this argument because the stock-swap merger
would not result in a change of control. 97 The stock of each company was
publicly traded, and the majority of the shares of each company were held
by disaggregated public stockholders. Accordingly, voting control of each
company was in the public markets. 98 The stock of the resulting
corporation would also be publicly traded, and control would remain in the
hands of disaggregated public stockholders. 99 Accordingly, the merger
would not result in a change of control, and the transaction would not
command the payment of a control premium. 100 The Chancellor reasoned
that, where a transaction did not create an opportunity to negotiate for a
control premium, Revlon was inapplicable, and the focus of the board’s
fiduciary duties remained on the long-term corporate benefit to be achieved
by the merger. Thus, according to the Chancellor, so long as the
stockholders will have on-going equity participation and control remains in
the public markets, the board may continue to pursue its long-term vision
for the company. 101
b.

Sale of Control

In Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 102 the
Delaware Supreme Court examined the other side of this proposition. The
challenged transaction would have combined Viacom and Paramount into a
publicly-held corporation in which Viacom’s majority stockholder would
96. Id.
97. Id. at *23.
98. Id.
99. Id. The original Time-Warner merger did not involve a change of control. Before
the merger, control of Time “existed in a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders
representing a voting majority—in other words, in the market,” and after the merger, control
of the resulting entity, Time-Warner, would remain in the market. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d
at 1150 (quoting Paramount 1989 WL 79880, at *21). The resulting corporation would be
bigger and have more stockholders, but public stockholders would retain control. In a
merger of publicly traded equals, the merger consideration need not include a control
premium because, in such a transaction, control has not been transferred to a new owner. It
remains with the publicly traded shares of the resulting corporation. The stockholders still
have the opportunity to obtain a control premium for their shares in the event someone seeks
to acquire control of the resulting company. Id. at 1151.
100. A control premium is the amount above a corporation’s going-concern value that an
acquirer will pay to be able to exercise control over the corporation.
101. The Delaware Supreme Court reached the same conclusion when it considered the
case on appeal. It stated: “Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived
corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain
the corporate strategy.” Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1154.
102. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
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hold a majority of the resulting stock. 103
The transaction was originally structured as a merger in which the
stockholders of Paramount would receive cash plus a mix of Viacom debt
and equity securities in consideration for their cancelled Paramount
shares. 104 When the deal was announced, QVC made a higher priced all
cash tender offer for Paramount. 105 To block QVC, Viacom and Paramount
modified their merger agreement to provide for a two-step transaction in
which Viacom would make an all cash tender offer for enough Paramount
shares to give it 51% of Paramount’s stock and then effectuate a squeezeout merger to cancel the remaining 49% of Paramount’s shares in exchange
for a mix of Viacom equity and debt securities. 106 At the end of the
process, Paramount’s stockholders would have received a mix of cash, debt
securities and shares of the combined enterprise. However, their shares
would constitute a minority of the voting power. 107 Sumner Redstone, the
majority stockholder of Viacom, would hold the majority of the votes in the
combined entity. 108
Paramount and Viacom argued that the agreement did not invoke
Revlon duties because the Paramount stockholders would have on-going
equity participation in the newly created enterprise. The court rejected this
argument because Paramount’s public stockholders would end up holding a
minority of the votes in the combined corporation. 109 The court explained
that the transaction amounted to a sale of control by Paramount’s
stockholders because, as stockholders of the resulting corporation, they
would no longer be able to form a majority voting block. 110 Such a
transaction demanded that the consideration to be paid to the shareholders
who would end up as minority shareholders of the resulting corporation
should include a control premium which reflected not only the value of
acquiring control, but also compensation for the corresponding loss of
control. 111 Because control can be sold only once, this transaction
represented the stockholders’ last opportunity to receive a control
premium. 112
The QVC court linked Revlon duties to transactions that involved a
sale of control. In this context, if a third party makes an unsolicited offer to
acquire the company, the board must consider the new offer because the
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 43.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 43.
QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
Id.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 43.
Id.
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board’s primary objective is to get the best deal for the stockholders. 113
Thus, the board cannot pursue the long-term plans that justify the stockswap merger when an alternative proposal offers the stockholders’ greater
value. The court said: “Where stock or other non-cash consideration is
involved, the board should try to quantify its value, if feasible, to achieve
an objective comparison of the alternatives . . . . [Then,] the directors must
decide which alternative is most likely to offer the best value reasonably
available to the stockholders.” 114
c.

Sale of Control Should Be Irrelevant to Duty-Shifting

QVC achieved the right result, but for the wrong reason. The court
correctly concluded that the board of Paramount had an obligation to
compare the value of QVC’s intervening bid against the value of the
pending Viacom deal, but that duty did not arise because the Viacom deal
involved a change of control that would justify a control premium. A
control premium is merely an element of value. Its availability does not
provide a principled reason to require a board to abandon a pending
business combination in favor of a more valuable offer. Nor does the nonavailability of a control premium provide a principled reason to allow a
board to pursue a less valuable transaction when a more valuable
transaction is available. Quite simply, the availability or non-availability of
a control premium is irrelevant to determining whether the board is subject
to Revlon duties.
The issue of whether a board is subject to Revlon duties is commonly
presented when a third party makes an apparently higher bid for the
corporation before a pending transaction has closed. In this context, the
board’s duty to consider whether the subsequent offer would be more
valuable to stockholders derives from the fact that the nature of the pending
transaction has put the board in a position where it is acting as an agent for
the corporation’s stockholders. All agents owe their principals a duty of
loyalty. In the context of a transaction that involves the conversion of the
stockholders’ shares into shares of another corporation, that duty of loyalty
requires the board to seek to maximize the consideration the stockholders
will receive for their shares. If another bidder makes an offer to acquire the
corporation, the board’s duty to stockholders requires it to determine
whether the new bid will allow the stockholders to receive greater value for
their shares than the pending offer. 115
113. Id. at 44.
114. QVC, 637 A.2d at 44-45.
115. See ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 110-11 (Del. Ch. 1999) (holding
unenforceable a lock-up provision which did not allow a target company to consider
unsolicited bids).

536

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:3

The difficulty arises when the board must make a decision between a
new bidder who offers an arguably higher price and a pending stock-swap
transaction that is intended to effectuate a long-term business plan. The
pending merger will serve the long-term prospects of the enterprise, but the
intervening offer arguably promises greater value to the stockholders, the
owners of the enterprise. The board’s duty to the corporation conflicts with
its duty to the stockholders. The Delaware courts, following the reasoning
in Chancellor Allen’s Time-Warner decision, have used the concept of
“change of control” to determine which duty predominates. Under current
Delaware law, in a non-control-shifting, stock-swap transaction, the board
does not have a duty to maximize the immediate value of the stockholders’
shares because the stock-swap was motivated by a long-term business plan
and will not result in a change of control.
The different treatment of control-shifting and non-control-shifting
stock-swap transactions makes little sense. Both transactions involve
ownership decisions because both will convert the stockholders’ shares of
their corporation’s stock into shares of the resulting corporation. The fact
that control remains in the market may justify the omission of a control
premium as an element of consideration for which the board has a duty to
negotiate, 116 but it does not explain why the board, which has initiated an
ownership transaction in which it must function as the stockholders’ agent,
can sacrifice the best interests of its principals (the stockholders) to pursue
a long-term business plan for the benefit of the corporation. Indeed, the
Delaware Supreme Court previously held that the board cannot consider
the interests of other corporate constituencies (who are the ones served by a
long-term business plan) unless the board can show that doing so would
enhance shareholder value. 117
When the board undertakes a transaction that presents ownership
issues, it takes on a duty to the stockholders. That duty prevents the board
from sacrificing the shareholders’ best interests by locking them into a
transaction that fulfills a long-term corporate plan when an alternative
transaction offers them greater value. 118 This is true for control-shifting

116. In a stock-swap merger of equals, there is no need for a control premium. The
exchange ratio merely needs to fairly reflect the respective values of the constituent
corporations. But, in a control-shifting stock-swap merger, the exchange ratio should also
include a control premium to compensate the shareholders for the control that they are
giving up.
117. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
118. From the view point of the shareholders on behalf of whom the board is negotiating,
a control-shifting transaction and a non-control-shifting transaction differ only in degree, not
in kind. In both, the board must justify the transaction on the basis that it will be more
valuable in the long-term for its stockholders who will be on-going equity participants in the
resulting business combination. And in both, the stockholders of the constituent
corporations will lose voting power because their shares will be converted into shares of the
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and non-control-shifting transactions alike. The board must compare the
present value of the business plans of the proposed business combination to
the immediate value of the third party’s offer. If the immediate value of the
third party’s offer is greater that the present value of the proposed business
combination, the board’s Revlon duty prevents it from going forward with
the less valuable business combination.
The Court of Chancery recognized this on-going duty in ACE Limited
v. Capital Re Corp. 119 There, the court addressed the question of whether,
in the context of a non-control-shifting, stock-swap merger, a corporation’s
merger partner could enforce deal protection measures that would prevent
the corporation’s board from abandoning the merger in favor of a higher
priced offer presented by a third party after the agreement had been signed
but before it had closed. Capital Re had agreed to be acquired by ACE
pursuant to a stock-for-stock merger. 120 Then, XL Capital, Ltd. made a
higher priced, all cash tender offer for all of Capital Re’s shares. 121 Capital
Re’s board determined that the XL offer was superior to ACE’s and sought
to terminate the merger agreement with ACE so that its stockholders could
accept XL’s tender offer. 122 The court recognized that even though the
stock-swap merger did not implicate Revlon duties, the board had an
ongoing duty to stockholders that required it to act in their best interests. 123
The merger had not closed, so the transaction had not reached a point
where ACE’s investment and expectations in the deal were so substantial
that it would be unfair for ACE’s contractual rights to give way to the
interest of Capital Re’s stockholders. 124 In reaching this result, the court
rejected ACE’s argument that Time-Warner and QVC permitted a board to
pursue a less valuable stock-swap merger as part of a long-term business
combined business entity, a larger company with a larger body of stockholders. The
difference lies only in the degree of voting power they will lose. In a control-shifting
transaction, the unaffiliated stockholders’ will see their voting power drop from 100% to
minority status. In a non-control-shifting transaction, their voting power will be diminished
from 100% to a percentage that reflects their corporations’ contribution to the combined
business entity. In both cases, the individual stockholders will experience a loss of voting
power.
119. 747 A.2d 95, 110-11 (Del. Ch. 1999).
120. Id. at 97.
121. Id. at 99.
122. Id. at 100.
123. Id. at 104-05.
124. Delaware has given primacy to the interest of stockholders in being free to
maximize value from their ownership of stock without improper compulsion from executory
contracts entered into by boards. Id.; see also Paul L. Regan, Great Expectations? A
Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate Lock-Ups, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 6
(1999) (“Historically, the judicial impulse in cases challenging the validity of break-up fees,
lock-ups, and no-shops amidst a proposed change of control transaction has been to protect
the interests of the target corporation’s stockholders . . . from potential lapses in fidelity by
their duly elected directors . . . .”).
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plan even when an intervening cash offer would allow the stockholders to
receive greater value for their shares. 125
ACE and Time-Warner have one thing in common: in both, the court
agreed with the board’s decision. However, that is the only commonality.
The challenged board decisions in the two cases were opposite. In ACE,
the board sought to be released from the pending transaction so that it could
pursue the intervening transaction. In Time-Warner, the board sought to
uphold the pending transaction so that it could reject the intervening
transaction. Time-Warner got it wrong. Its reliance on the board’s
prerogative to adopt long-term business plans for a corporation ignored the
fact that the transaction in issue required the board to function as the
stockholders’ agent. ACE recognized that the board’s duty to the
stockholders required it to abandon long-term plans when a better deal
became available.
D.

Conclusion

The determination of whether the board’s fiduciary duties should be
directed toward serving the long-term welfare of the corporation or shortterm maximization of the value of the corporation’s shares turns on
whether the nature of the transaction under consideration requires the board
to function as an agent for the stockholders. If the board is functioning as
an agent for the stockholders, it must serve their best interests. It can only
pursue long-term corporate interests if the pursuit of those interests also
serves the stockholders’ best interests. 126
The stockholders become the principal beneficiaries of the board’s
fiduciary duties when the board considers a transaction that will alter their
ownership interest in the corporation. This includes cash-for-stock
transactions that will terminate the stockholders’ equity participation in the
enterprise and stock-for-stock transactions in which the stockholders will
have on-going equity participation in the resulting business combination.
A transaction that will terminate the stockholders’ ownership of the
company represents the last opportunity for stockholders to profit from
their investment in the corporation. In this circumstance, the board’s
fiduciary duties are focused on the objective of maximizing the immediate
value for stockholders. In a stock-swap transaction, the board must be
satisfied that their company’s stockholders will be better off, over the longterm, as stockholders of the resulting business combination. 127 If it were
125. Capital Re, 747 A.2d at 107-08.
126. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
127. The board must also make sure that the exchange ratio reflects its corporation’s
contribution to the resulting business combination. Change of control is relevant to
determining how much consideration should be paid to the shareholders who are losing
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not so, there would be no reason to pursue the merger. However, this longterm component does not change the fact that the board is functioning as an
agent for the stockholders.
As the stockholders’ agent, the board has a duty to make sure the
transaction will allow the stockholders to receive the highest reasonable
value for their shares. The board also has an ongoing duty to consider any
alternative proposal presented before the pending transaction closes. The
board’s duty to the stockholders would prevent it from pursuing the
pending transaction as part of a long-term business plan if an intervening
transaction offered greater value to the stockholders (who are, after all, said
to be the owners of the corporation, and whose property, the shares of the
corporation’s stock, will be converted into shares of the resulting
corporation’s stock). The board does not have to accept the third party’s
offer. 128 It retains the power to abandon the pending deal and remove the
corporation from the deal market. 129 But, the board does not have the
power to force an inferior deal on the corporation’s stockholders.
III. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
When a stockholder brings a claim challenging a transaction approved
by his company’s board of directors there are two possible areas of inquiry.
The first is legal in nature and asks whether the directors complied with
their fiduciary duties in making the challenged decision. The second looks
to the merits of the decision and asks whether it will serve the corporation’s
best interests.
The second area of inquiry, standing alone, does not provide a valid
basis for a claim against the directors. Business decisions require the board
to make judgments about the future. The future is never certain. There is
always a probability that events will turn out differently than planned. It
follows that a carefully made decision motivated by a good faith belief that
it will serve the corporation’s best interests may turn out badly and leave
the corporation in worse shape than it would have been in had the decision
not been made. There is always risk of failure, and the pursuit of profit
requires corporations to take calculated business risks.
The business judgment rule allows boards to take calculated business
risks without fear of incurring personal liability if things turn out badly. It
accomplishes this by preventing courts from reviewing the substantive
merits of business decisions made in good faith by independent and
disinterested directors. To successfully challenge a board decision, a
control.
128. Pogostine v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984)
129. Gantler v. Stephens, No. 2392-VCP, 2008 WL 401124, at *8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 14,
2008).
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plaintiff must prove that the decision was made in violation of the
directors’ fiduciary duties. The business judgment rule establishes the
procedure by which Delaware’s judiciary reviews the directors’
performance of their fiduciary duty. 130
A.

The Presumption of Judicial Deference

The business judgment rule functions as a procedural rule and as a
substantive rule of law. 131 On the procedural level, the business judgment
rule begins with the presumption that “in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the
company.” 132 In other words, the rule presumes that the directors have
complied with their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. 133 The rule
requires the plaintiff to rebut this presumption by showing 134 facts that give
reason to doubt the directors’ performance of these duties. 135 If the
plaintiff fails to produce such evidence, the presumption that the directors
acted with care and loyalty stands un-rebutted.
At this point the “substantive” aspect of the rule comes into play. The
business judgment rule provides that “a decision made by a loyal and
informed board will not be overturned by the courts . . . .” 136 In other
words, the court will not examine the merits of the directors’ decision in
the absence of facts showing a breach of the duty of care or suggesting a

130. See In re Citigroup S’holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009), in which
the plaintiffs sought to hold Citigroup’s directors liable for losses sustained by the
corporation in the sub-prime mortgage market. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims,
explaining: “[P]laintiff shareholders [are] attempting to hold the director defendants
personally liable for making (or allowing to be made) business decisions that, in hindsight,
turned out poorly for the Company. Delaware Courts have faced these types of claims many
times and have developed doctrines to deal with them - the fiduciary duty of care and the
business judgment rule. These doctrines properly focus on the decision-making process
rather than on a substantive evaluation of the merits of the decision. This follows from the
inadequacy of the Court, due in part to a concept known as hindsight bias,[footnote omitted]
to properly evaluate whether corporate decision-makers made a ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ decision.”
964 A.2d at 124.
131. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d. 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
132. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
133. Orman, 794 A.2d at 19-20; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811-12; Cede, 634 A.2d. at 361.
134. “Showing” is used here to embrace both the plaintiff’s burden of pleading such
facts in the complaint and proving such facts at trial.
135. Cede, 634 A.2d. at 361; Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162
(Del. 1995).
136. Cede, 634 A.2d. at 361. The court quotes Sinclair Oil Corp. to the effect that the
court can overturn a decision if “it cannot be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.’”
Id.
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possible breach of the duty of loyalty. 137 This substantive component of
the business judgment rule requires judges to defer to a business judgment
made by impartial and careful directors provided the decision is not
completely irrational. 138 It is this principal of judicial deference that
protects impartial and careful directors from personal liability for a
decision made with due care and with a good faith belief that it would serve
the best interests of the corporation, even if the decision turns out to have
been a bad one. 139
B.

Review of Fiduciary Duties

The business judgment rule places the burden on the plaintiff to rebut
the presumption that the directors acted in accordance with their fiduciary
duties. The plaintiff can do this in two ways: it may show facts that place
the director’s duty of loyalty in issue; 140 or it may show facts that show a
breach of the duty of care. 141
1.

Duty of Loyalty

The duty of loyalty requires a director “affirmatively to protect the
interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain
from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to
deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly
bring to it . . . .” 142 The director’s decisions must be made with a good faith
belief that the course of action they are choosing will serve the best
interests of the corporation. 143 “Essentially, the duty of loyalty mandates
that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes

137. The Delaware courts will not “second-guess” decisions made by disinterested and
independent directors. Cede, 634 A.2d. at 361; Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument
Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
138. E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52
BUS. LAW. 393, 393-94 (1997); David Rosenberg, Galactic Stupidity and the Business
Judgment Rule, 32 J. CORP. L. 301, 301-02 (2006).
139. The court “should decline to evaluate the wisdom and merits of a business decision”
made with due care by a board which is independent and disinterested. MacMillan II, 559
A.2d at 1279.
140. See, e.g., Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 954-55 (Del. 1992) (finding
the presumptions of the business judgment rule were rebutted where duty of loyalty issues
were raised by allegations showing that directors had diverted corporate assets to their
private use and by allegations that directors were under the domination and control of an
individual who owned a company that benefited from its dealings with the corporation).
141. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864-71 (outlining the classic example of a breach of
the duty of care).
142. Cede, 634 A.2d. at 361.
143. Id.
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precedence over any interest possessed by a director . . . .” 144
The business judgment rule’s presumption that a director acted
consistently with his duty of loyalty may be rebutted by facts that suggest
that the director was not in a position to make an impartial assessment of
the corporation’s best interests. Classically, two fact patterns place a
director’s impartiality in issue. The first involves a director who has a
direct, or indirect, interest in the pending decision that conflicts with those
of the corporation. 145 The second involves a director who is under the
influence of a person whose interests in the transaction conflict with those
Both situations compromise the director’s
of the corporation. 146
impartiality.
The existence of facts that establish a director’s lack of impartiality,
standing alone, are not sufficient to prove a breach of the director’s duty of
loyalty. 147 The compromised director may have subordinated his selfinterest and approved the challenge decision with a good faith belief that it
would serve the best interest of the corporation. In that circumstance, the
duty of loyalty is still served. 148 But, the existence of facts that place the
director’s impartiality in doubt are enough to require the compromised
director to prove that his or her decision was intended to serve the
corporation’s best interests. Accordingly, the business judgment rule
imposes a burden of proof on compromised directors that requires them to
prove that the challenged transaction is “entirely fair” to the corporation.
2.

Duty of Care

The duty of care requires directors, individually and collectively, to
“inform[] themselves, ‘prior to making a business decision, of all material

144. Id.
145. This would be the case where the director stands on both sides of the transaction,
Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1374 (Del. 1993), or where the director has a financial
interest in the party on the other side of the corporation. Even in an arms-length transaction,
a director may have a material self-interest that will compromise his objectivity. Cede, 634
A.2d. at 362.
146. This is where directors are employed by the other party. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (holding that the presence of officers and directors of the majority
stockholder on the board of the subsidiary corporation raised duty of loyalty issues
regarding the subsidiary board’s approval of a merger between parent and subsidiary);
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 102 (1952) (noting that officers and directors of
majority stockholder who constituted a majority of the subsidiary corporation’s board were
“on both sides of the transaction” which implicated the entire fairness standard of review).
But see Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 955 (Del. 1992) (involving directors
beholden to an interested party).
147. Cede, 634 A.2d. at 361.
148. It is no violation of the duty of loyalty to place the best interest of the corporation
ahead of one’s own self-interest.
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information reasonably available to them’” 149 and to act with requisite care
in deliberating on the decision. 150 This requires directors to take an active
and direct role in the decision-making process. 151 But, mere negligence is
not enough to establish a violation of the duty of care. 152 To establish an
actionable breach of the duty of care, the plaintiff must show that the
director acted with gross negligence. 153
Evidence regarding a breach of the duty of care is different than
evidence regarding a breach of the duty of loyalty. Proof that a director is
not in a position to make an impartial judgment does not, standing alone,
establish a breach of the duty of loyalty. 154 But, proof that a director acted
with gross negligence is enough, standing alone, to establish a breach of the
duty of care. 155 What remains is to establish that this lack of care caused
damage to the corporation or its stockholders. 156 In the tort context, the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove that damages were proximately caused
by the defendant’s negligence. But, in the fiduciary duty context, the
plaintiff is relieved of this burden. 157 Instead, the grossly negligent
directors must prove that the decision was entirely fair to the corporation,
despite their lack of diligence.
C.

Review of the Merits: Entire Fairness

Once the plaintiff has shown that the directors’ impartiality is
compromised or that the challenged transaction was tainted by a breach of
the duty of care, the business judgment rule shifts the burden of proof to the
directors and requires them to demonstrate that the challenged transaction
was “entirely fair” to the corporation.
If the entire fairness analysis was triggered by a showing that the

149. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
150. Cede, 634 A.2d. at 367.
151. Citron, 569 A.2d at 66.
152. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
153. Id. at 875. Of course, there are few instances in which courts hold directors
personally liable for damages resulting from breach of the duty of care. Van Gorkom is
noteworthy because it was so unusual. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van
Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 490 (2000). Moreover, most corporations have 102(b)(7)
provisions in the certificates of incorporation that protect their directors from personal
liability for breach of the duty of care. 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7). However, breach of the duty
of care remains important in claims seeking injunctive relief and other equitable remedies
that do not involve the imposition of financial damages on the directors.
154. However, it is sufficient to require the director to prove that the challenged decision
was entirely fair to the corporation, and thus that it was consistent with his obligation to
serve the corporation’s best interests.
155. Cede, 634 A.2d. at 367; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
156. Cede, 634 A.2d. at 367.
157. Id.
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directors lacked impartiality, a finding that the transaction was entirely fair
to the corporation will support the conclusion that the compromised
directors did, in fact, satisfy their duty to serve the corporation’s best
interests. In this circumstance there has been no breach of the duty of
loyalty and no remedy is required. But, if the court concludes that the
transaction was not entirely fair to the corporation the court will infer that
the dubious directors were motivated by self-interest rather than the best
interests of the corporation. In this circumstance there has been a breach of
the duty of loyalty and the transaction will be enjoined or the directors will
be held personally liable to the corporation for damages caused by their
breach of fiduciary duty.
If the entire fairness analysis was triggered by a showing that the
directors were grossly negligent, the analysis is slightly different. The
business judgment rule requires the grossly negligent directors to prove
that, notwithstanding their lack of care, the transaction was “entirely fair”
to the corporation. If the directors can prove this, if follows that breach of
the duty of care did not harm the corporation. As a consequence the court
will not award a remedy. But, if the transaction was not entirely fair, it will
be enjoined or the directors will be held personally liable to the corporation
for damages caused by their gross negligence.
D.

Conclusion

The business judgment rule functions like an “on/off” switch. If the
plaintiff cannot call the loyalty of a majority of the directors who approved
a challenged transaction into question by showing that they were subject to
conflicting interests or were under the influence of a person with
conflicting interests, or if the plaintiff cannot prove that a majority of the
directors breached their duty of care, the court will not review the merits of
the decision. Instead, it will defer to the business judgment of the
corporation’s disinterested, independent, and careful directors. But where
the plaintiff can establish reason to doubt the loyalty or the diligence of the
directors, the rule requires the dubious directors to prove that the
challenged transaction was entirely fair. In other words, in the absence of a
breach of fiduciary duty, the court will not examine the substantive merits
of the challenged decision, but in the presence of such a breach, it will look
at the substantive merits to make sure the challenged transaction was
entirely fair to the corporation. 158
158. The substantive and procedural aspects of the business judgment rule correlate to
the substantive and procedural aspects of the challenged decision making. Procedurally, the
burden is on the plaintiff to show that the procedure by which the challenged decision was
made was somehow defective. This defect may derive from the fact that the decisionmakers lacked objectivity or the fact that the decision-makers were grossly negligent. If so,
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IV. ENHANCED SCRUTINY
The business judgment rule’s requirement of judicial deference to a
decision made by impartial and careful directors proved unsatisfactory
when the courts were called upon to consider transactions designed to fend
off unsolicited takeover bids. Complete judicial deference seemed to give
the board too much latitude in a situation in which the decision to thwart a
takeover bid might have been motivated by the directors’ desire to retain
the benefits of corporate office rather than the best interests of the
corporation and its stockholders. On the other hand, the entire fairness
standard was inapposite because these defensive transactions were
approved by independent, disinterested, and careful directors. And, even if
the directors’ possible interest in retaining their corporate positions were
deemed to compromise their impartially, the entire fairness standard did not
quite work because the transactions were accomplished under terms that
were entirely fair to the corporation.
The real issue in these cases was the boards’ good faith. The fact that
the defense of the corporation also had the effect of defending the
directors’ jobs raised a question: Were the directors motivated by a good
faith belief that the company was in danger, as they claimed, or were they
actually motivated by a desire to save their jobs? 159 Plaintiffs argued that
the directors’ sole or primary purpose was to entrench themselves in
office. 160 This argument made some sense when a majority of the directors
who approved the defensive transaction were also senior officers of the
corporation. Their positions as corporate officers represented their primary
source of income which provided a powerful motive for entrenchment.
But, when a majority of the directors were not employed by the
corporation, the entrenchment motive fit less well. 161 They were not

the court will then examine the substance of the decision. In other words, the court’s first
level of inquiry is to look at the procedure by which the challenged decision was made. In
the absence of a procedural problem it will not examine the substantive merits of the
decision. Or if the procedure was deficient (either because the people that made it lacked
objectivity or were grossly negligent) then the decision-makers must prove that the decision
did in fact serve the best interest of the corporation. That is, that the decision was entirely
fair to the corporation.
159. The court recognized that if it allowed the business judgment rule to apply to these
kinds of transactions, it would amount to a license to every board in the country to simply
take defensive measures against all takeovers. Such a rule would give boards too much
power. On the other hand, if all of these transactions were subjected to the entire fairness
standard, it would impose too great a burden on boards seeking to establish the fairness of
the defensive measures adopted by the boards. What was needed, and what the Unocal
decision sought to provide, was a middle ground.
160. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 438-39 (Del. 1971); Petty v.
Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975).
161. An outside director’s interest in the fees he or she is paid for services is not
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protecting a job that represented their primary income. And, if the courts
were to consider the preservation of a directorship as a sufficient motive to
support a claim of entrenchment, then all defensive actions would be
automatically deemed self-interested and thus subject to judicial review
under the entire fairness standard. That would have been too broad a brush,
since corporations needed to be able to defend against hostile takeovers that
posed a legitimate threat to the corporation or its stockholders.
Because both motives (defense of the corporation and retention of
corporate office) could reasonably be inferred from the decision to take
corporate action designed to block a takeover, the courts required the
directors whose motives were in doubt to rebut the inference that they were
motivated by an improper purpose by proving that the defense was
intended to serve a valid corporate purpose. 162 If a valid corporate purpose
was present, the courts presumed that the corporate purpose was the
primary motive. The directors having thus neutralized the inference that
their actions were motivated by an improper purpose, the courts would
defer to the directors’ decision to block the threatened takeover.
A.

Unocal: Enhanced Scrutiny of Defensive Transactions

This approach was crystallized in the famous Unocal v. Mesa
Petroleum decision. 163 In Unocal, Mesa Petroleum launched a two-step
takeover bid to takeover Unocal Corporation. 164 The first step was a tender
offer for thirty-seven percent of Unocal’s outstanding shares, an amount
which taken together with Mesa’s existing holdings of slightly more than
thirteen percent, would give Mesa voting control of Unocal. 165 Mesa’s
offering price was fifty-four dollars per share, a modest premium over
Unocal’s pre-offer trading price of forty-six dollars. 166 The second step
was a squeeze-out merger in which the remaining Unocal shareholders
would receive highly subordinated debt instruments with a face value of
fifty-four dollars per share, but an actual value that would likely be
considered sufficient to compromise his or her independence. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d
180, 188 (Del. 1988).
162. The business judgment rule applies to defensive maneuvers. The cases hold that a
selective repurchase of the dissident's stock is a valid means of eliminating the perceived
harm from a threatened takeover. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964); Kors v.
Carey, 158 A.2d 136, 141 (Del. Ch. 1960); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568-69 (Del.
Ch. 1977); see also Veasey, supra note 134, at 398 (explaining that, under Delaware law,
plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that directors exercising defensive
measures have acted unreasonably if they believed in good faith that a threat to the
corporation existed and the response to the threat was proportional).
163. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
164. Id. at 949.
165. Id.
166. Id.

2009]

REVLON DOCTRINE

547

somewhat lower. 167
In an effort to block Mesa’s tender offer, Unocal offered to purchase
forty-nine percent of its own outstanding stock in exchange for senior
Unocal debt securities to be valued at seventy-two dollars per share. 168 The
exchange offer was extended to all Unocal shareholders except Mesa. 169
The exchange offer would defeat Mesa’s tender offer because Unocal’s
stockholders would accept the more valuable exchange offer rather than
Mesa’s lower priced cash offer. It would also punish Mesa because Mesa’s
shares, which were excluded, would be devalued when the exchange offer
closed. Mesa responded by seeking, and obtaining, a preliminary
injunction against Unocal’s exchange offer. 170 On appeal, the Delaware
Supreme Court was called upon to define the standard by which it would
review the board’s decision to approve the defensive exchange offer. 171
Unocal, pointing to the uncontested fact that a majority of its directors were
independent and disinterested and had exercised due care, argued that their
decision to approve the exchange offer was entitled to judicial deference
under the business judgment rule. 172 Mesa, on the other hand, argued that
the exchange offer should be reviewed under the entire fairness standard
because its exclusion of Mesa violated the board’s duty to treat all
stockholders equally. 173
The court rejected both arguments and fashioned a new, intermediate
standard of review 174 that would allow the court to examine the board’s
167. Id. at 949-50.
168. Id. at 951.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 953.
172. Id. The decision to implement these various defensive measures was taken by an
independent and disinterested board, the vast majority of whom were outsiders. The board
acted quickly, but with great diligence. It was advised by independent financial advisors
and by independent outside council. In short, under the business judgment rule, the court
had no ground on which it would be able to review the substance of the board’s decisions
challenged by the plaintiff’s complaint.
173. Id. The entire fairness standard of review is not well suited to analyzing the
challenged transaction in Unocal. That concept is useful in determining whether or not the
corporation got the benefit of the bargain when a fiduciary is on both sides of the table or is
beholden to the party across the table. In Unocal, however, the decision did not involve the
fairness of the transaction. Rather, it involved the fairness of excluding a hostile bidder
from the exchange offer that was intended to block the hostile bidder’s tender offer. The
company was not a party to the tender offer. And, there was no argument that the exchange
offer was not at a fair price. The real issue was whether the board had a right and a
sufficient reason to interpose a defense against Mesa’s offer.
174. EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW:
FUNDAMENTALS § 141.2.4.1 (2009 ed.). If Mesa had been able to prove facts that would
rebut the presumptions of the business judgment rule, the court would subject the challenged
transaction to “strict scrutiny” required under the “entire fairness” standard, the most
rigorous standard of review under Delaware law. See, e.g., MacMillan II, 559 A.2d at 1279
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reasons for approving the defensive transaction. The court explained:
“Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily
in its own interest, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders,
there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the
threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be
conferred.” 175 This judicial examination came to be known as “enhanced
scrutiny.”
On a substantive level, Unocal presented two issues: (1) whether a
corporation had a right to interfere with a tender offer extended to its
stockholders by a third-party; 176 and (2) whether Unocal’s board had
breached its fiduciary duty to Mesa, a stockholder, by excluding it from
participation in the exchange offer. 177 In deciding the first issue, the court
held that a board had “a fundamental duty and obligation to protect the
corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders, from harm reasonably
perceived.” 178 Regarding the second issue, the court held that Mesa’s
exclusionary exchange offer was a reasonable response to the threats posed
by Mesa’s tender offer. 179
These two points solidified into what has come to be known as the
two-prong “Unocal standard.” The first prong requires the directors who
approved the defensive action to prove that their decision was based on a
reasonable belief that the takeover bid posed a threat to the corporation or
its stockholders. 180 In other words, the directors have the burden of proving
facts that neutralize the possible inference that they were actually
protecting their jobs rather than the corporation or its stockholders. 181 The
second prong requires the directors to prove that their defensive response
was “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.” 182 This requires the court
(applying the entire fairness standard).
175. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
176. The corporation is not a party to the tender offer and thus it arguably had no right to
interfere with the offer extended by the third party directly to the stockholders.
177. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953.
178. Id. at 954. In Unocal, the offer threatened stockholders in two prominent ways.
First, it was undervalued. Id. The board estimated Unocal to be worth much more than the
fifty-four dollars per share offered by Mesa. Id. Second, it was coercive. Id. The two step
structure meant that a financially rational shareholder would have to tender his shares into
the cash tender offer, even though he believed the price was inadequate, because if he
didn’t, he would be squeezed out by the second-step merger in exchange for junk bonds of
dubious value. Id.
179. The court found that the exclusion of Mesa from the exchange offer was reasonable
because what minority shareholders received under it was substantially equal in value to
their holdings prior to the exchange offer. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956.
180. Id. at 955.
181. Id. at 954. This proof is enhanced by a showing that a majority of the board is made
up of independent outside directors: people who are less likely than highly paid corporate
officers to have an entrenchment motive.
182. Id. at 955.
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to examine the merits of the defensive transaction to see if it is likely to
accomplish its defensive purpose without achieving disproportionate
results.
Importantly, Unocal placed the defensive transaction under enhanced
scrutiny because of the need to clear away the “specter” that these
apparently impartial directors might have been defending their corporate
offices rather than the corporation or its stockholders. Once the directors
removed this specter by establishing that they responded reasonably to a
perceived threat to the corporation or the stockholders, the court gave their
decision the judicial deference to which it would have ordinarily been
entitled under the business judgment rule.
B.

Revlon: Enhanced Scrutiny of Sale Transactions

In Revlon, 183 Revlon’s board responded to Pantry Pride’s unsolicited
bid to takeover the company by agreeing to “sell the company” to a white
knight, Forstmann-Little & Co. 184 Pantry Pride sought to enjoin the
enforcement of certain deal protection measures in the agreement because
they prevented Pantry Pride from going forward with its higher priced
tender offer. Because the white knight deal was intended to defeat Pantry
Pride’s unsolicited takeover bid, the court found that there was an
“omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders.” 185
Accordingly, the court subjected the deal protection measures to enhanced
scrutiny, the standard of review prescribed by Unocal for defensive
transactions. 186
1.

Sale of the Company

Over time, the fact that Revlon involved a specter of entrenchment lost
its significance, and the “Revlon doctrine” came to stand for the idea that
all challenged transaction involving the sale of the company must be
subject to enhanced scrutiny. The detachment of enhanced scrutiny from
the “omnipresent specter” began with the court’s decisions in MacMillan
II. There, the court held, without explanation, that all decisions made by
the board in circumstances that imposed Revlon duties would be subject to

183. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
184. Id. at 183.
185. Id. at 180 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954). Moreover, the court held that
Revlon’s directors were so self-interested in the transaction that they would not be entitled
to the favorable presumptions of the business judgment rule. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177 n.3.
186. Id. at 176, 180, 184. Moreover, the court found that the directors approved the
transaction for self-interested purposes. Id.
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enhanced scrutiny. It said “[w]hen Revlon duties devolve upon directors,
this Court will continue to exact an enhanced judicial scrutiny at the
threshold, as in Unocal, before the normal presumptions of the business
judgment rule will apply.” 187 Thus, a transaction involving the sale of the
company would be subjected to enhanced scrutiny even though the
circumstances of the transaction did not involve a “specter” that the
directors might have been motivated by an improper purpose.
2.

Sale of Control

The next step came in QVC. There, the court expanded the reach of
so-called “Revlon duties” beyond a sale of the company to include a stockswap merger that would accomplish a “sale of control.” 188 Having
concluded that the sale of control invoked Revlon duties, the court,
following the precedent established in MacMillan, reviewed the board’s
decision to approve the merger under enhanced scrutiny.
Recognizing that such intensive review constituted a deviation from
the business judgment rule’s policy favoring judicial deference to decisions
made by disinterest, independent, and diligent directors, the court provided
two justifications. First, the court relied on Delaware’s traditional practice
of taking a close look at board actions that tend to impair or impede
stockholder voting rights. 189 Second, the court relied on the idea that a
sale-of-control transaction put the board in the position of selling an asset
(i.e., control) that belonged to public stockholders, and for which they
deserved a control premium. The court explained that “[t]here are few
events that have a more significant impact on the stockholders than a sale
of control or a corporate breakup. Each event represents a fundamental
(and perhaps irrevocable) change in the nature of the corporate enterprise
from a practical standpoint. It is the significance of each of these events . .
.” that requires the court to closely scrutinize board action that could be
contrary to the stockholders’ interests. 190
Neither of the justifications offered by the court provides a convincing

187. Macmillan II, 559 A.2d at 1288.
188. Quoting with approval from Chancellor Allen’s opinion in Time-Warner, the court
notes that a stock-for-stock transaction where ownership of the surviving entity remains in
the public markets does not constitute a change of control. Therefore, Revlon does not
apply. QVC, 637 A.2d at 47. But, a stock-for-stock transaction in which a persons ends up
owning a controlling block of the surviving corporations stock will constitute a change of
control and will, therefore, be governed by Revlon. Id.
189. The court ignored the fact that the cases on which it relied involved unilateral action
by the board that interfered with stockholders ability to use their voting power. A merger,
by way of distinction, requires the affirmative vote by an absolute majority of the
stockholders.
190. QVC, 637 A.2d at 47-48.
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reason to review control-shifting transactions under enhanced scrutiny.
The voting cases on which the court relied all involve unilateral efforts by
the board to manipulate the voting process. A merger, on the other hand,
does not involve unilateral board action (it must be approved by
stockholders). Further, reduction in the stockholders’ voting power (for
which they presumably receive a control premium) is not the result of
manipulation. The fact that a control-shifting merger is important does not
provide a principled reason to depart from the business judgment rule’s
policy that requires judicial deference to rational business decisions made
by independent directors elected by the stockholders to make such
decision. 191 The business judgment rule trusts independent directors to
make important decisions in other contexts, there is no reason why they
should not be trusted to approve a merger that results in a change in
control. 192
Moreover, neither justification explains why a control-shifting stockswap transaction should be treated differently than a non-control-shifting
stock-swap transaction. The former is subject to enhanced scrutiny; the
latter is entitled to judicial deference under the business judgment rule.
Yet, in both the stockholders’ voting power will be diminished. They
differ only in the degree of diminution. In a simple stock-swap transaction,
each shareholder’s voting power is diluted because the shareholder will be
part of a larger group of stockholders who own shares of a larger company.
The same is true of a change of control transaction; the only difference is
that the public shareholders are diluted to a minority position. In both
situations the board is “selling” an asset that belongs to the stockholders
because it is negotiating the terms under which the shares of stock owned
by the stockholders will be converted in to shares of the resulting
corporation. The only difference is that the change of control transaction
offers the possibility of a control premium. But, a control premium is
merely another element of value, not, as the court characterizes it, a unique
property right belonging to the stockholders.
C.

The Standard for Enhanced Scrutiny

The court’s first effort to articulate a standard to guide enhanced
scrutiny came in MacMillan II. 193 The court explained that enhanced
scrutiny under Revlon would, of necessity, be slightly different from the
analysis under Unocal. 194 As MacMillan II explained it, enhanced scrutiny
191. Regan, supra note 23, at 129.
192. By definition, in a change of control transaction, the directors are unlikely to have a
self-serving interest in preserving their corporate offices.
193. MacMillan II, 559 A.2d at 1288.
194. Id.

552

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:3

involves a two-part test. The first issue is whether the directors properly
perceived that the challenged transaction would enhance the shareholders
interests. The second issue is whether the challenged transaction is
reasonably likely to achieve that objective. 195 If the board’s decision to sell
the company passes this two-part test, the court would defer to the board’s
business judgment, or as the cases express it, the transaction will be entitled
to the protections of the business judgment rule. “Once a finding has been
made by a court that the directors have fulfilled their fundamental duties of
care and loyalty under the forgoing standards there is no further judicial
inquiry into the matter.” 196
This purported two-part MacMillan test is a little confusing. The first
part seems to come down to this inquiry: Did the board reasonably believe
that the challenged transaction would be of benefit to stockholders? The
second seems to ask whether the transaction was related to achieving that
benefit. But, this second question is, in reality, nothing more than a
component of the first question. If the challenged transaction were not
reasonably related to the goal of achieving a benefit for stockholders, it is
hard to see how a board could reasonably believe that it would be of benefit
to stockholders. For the board to reasonably believe that the challenged
transaction would benefit stockholders, the transaction must be related to
achieving that benefit.
In the final analysis, the Macmillan standard for enhanced scrutiny
requires the court to do two things: First, it must draw inferences about the
board’s subjective belief by examining the information available to the
board and how the board used that information during its decision making
process. Second, it must examine the substantive merits of the challenged
transaction to see if it would come reasonably close to accomplishing the
outcome the board sought to achieve.
In QVC, the court rephrased the MacMillan test, stating that the “key
features of an enhanced scrutiny test are: (a) a judicial determination
regarding the adequacy of the decision-making process employed by the
directors, including the information on which the directors based their
decision; and (b) a judicial examination of the reasonableness of the
directors action in light of the circumstances then existing.” 197 The
directors have the burden of proving both points.
This formulation of enhanced scrutiny is squarely at odds with the
business judgment rule. The business judgment rule requires the plaintiff
to rebut the presumption that the directors satisfied their duty of care.
Enhanced scrutiny, on the other hand, requires the directors to prove that
their decision was based on adequate information and was the result of an
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45.
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adequate decision-making process. In other words, the directors must
prove that they complied with their duty of care. But, that is not all. The
business judgment rule prevents the court from reviewing the merits of a
business decision made with due care by independent directors. Enhanced
scrutiny, on the other hand, requires the directors to prove that that they
made a “reasonable” decision. 198 This invitation to judicial secondguessing necessarily requires the court to consider the merits of the
challenged decision.
In an apparent recognition that enhanced scrutiny represents a judicial
intrusion into an area that had traditionally been the exclusive domain of
directors, the court acknowledged that judicial examination of the merits of
the board’s decision must be sensitive to the complexity of the transaction.
The court also emphasized that the court should not substitute its view as to
the best course of action for that of the board. Rather, the court should
determine whether the board made a reasonable, rather than a perfect,
decision. If the board’s decision is one of several reasonable alternatives, it
should be approved by the court even if the judge thinks a different course
of action would have been better. 199
V.

ENHANCED SCRUTINY OF CLAIMS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Enhanced scrutiny was first applied in cases in which plaintiffs sought
injunctive relief, first under Unocal, to review defensive actions taken in
response to a threatened takeover, then under Revlon to review decisions to
approve business combinations that would constitute a sale of the company
or achieve a sale of control. In the Revlon context, the courts did not
require plaintiffs to define whether the alleged failure to achieve the best
available deal resulted from a breach of the duty of loyalty or the duty of
care. Rather, the courts spoke generally of a duty to get the best price. In
some cases, notably Omnicare, the court granted injunctive relief in the
absence of any facts that would suggest a breach of either duty. 200
A more precise analysis would show that Revlon duties involve both
the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. The duty of loyalty is owed to the
stockholders and requires to directors to focus their efforts on achieving a
transaction that will maximize the immediate value of their shares. The
duty of care requires directors to gather adequate information, follow an
adequate decision-making process, and pursue a course of action that is
198. Id. at n.17. The court admits this it is not applying the business judgment rule.
199. Id. at 46.
200. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (2002) (issuing an injunction
that prevented enforcement of certain deal protection measures in a merger agreement that
made shareholder approval of the merger a certainty, even though the board acted in good
faith and with due care in approving the merger agreement).
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reasonably likely to achieve the result defined by the duty of loyalty.
A.

Reasonableness of the Board’s Decision-Making

The standard used by the court in claims for injunctive relief to review
the board’s efforts to achieve the best available deal stands in stark contrast
to the standard by which the court judges the duty of care under the
business judgment rule. 201 Under the business judgment rule, the plaintiff
must prove that the directors acted with “gross negligence.” 202 But, under
enhanced scrutiny the directors must prove that they followed a reasonable
decision-making process.
The requirement that directors follow a
“reasonable” decision-making process imposes a higher standard of
conduct than the business judgment rule which merely requires that
directors avoid gross negligence.
Enhanced scrutiny views the duty of care in terms of reasonableness, a
negligence concept. The courts explain that the directors “must act
reasonably in order to secure the highest price reasonably available.” 203
This means the directors must “take a reasonable course of action under the
circumstances presented.” 204 The court looks at the reasonableness of each
decision made by the board throughout sales process. At each decision
point, the court asks whether the directors’ decision was within the range of
decisions that would have been reasonable in the circumstance. 205 No
single course of action is required. 206 “Because there can be several
reasoned ways to try to maximize value, the court cannot find fault so long
as the directors chose a reasoned course of action.” 207 Resolution of these
questions requires a fact-intensive review of the circumstances that led to
the sale of the company.
The primary concern is whether the directors have followed a
procedure that allows them to have enough information about the value of
their corporation, the market for corporate control, and the range of
potential buyers to allow them to make well informed decision that they
have achieved the best available transaction for the stockholders. Directors

201. Although the Delaware Supreme Court has not fully articulated the distinction, the
Delaware courts seem to recognize a difference between claims that seek to impose personal
liability on directors who approved the challenged transaction and claims that seek
injunctive relief. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 946 (Del. 1985) (vacating preliminary injunction
requested by minority shareholder).
202. Van Gorkom 488 A.2d at 873 (Del. 1985).
203. Lear, 926 A.2d at 115.
204. Id.
205. QVC, 637 A.2d at 44.
206. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286-87 (Del. 1989).
207. Lear, 926 A.2d 94 at 115 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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must actively participate in the process. 208 Two time periods are relevant—
the period before the deal is signed, and the period after it is signed, when
other potential buyers may make offers to acquire the company.
1.

Pre-Signing: The Search for the Best Deal

Where the transaction is achieved through an auction, the directors’
duty of care requires them to make sure that the auction process allows all
bidders to compete on a level playing field. 209 This means that all bidders
must receive substantially equivalent information. 210 It also means that the
board’s decision to waive a bidding deadline, or to allow an additional
round of bids, or not to allow an additional round of bids, 211 or to accept
one of two substantially equivalent bids, must be fair to all bidders and be
based on a carefully formed and reasonable belief that it would be in the
stockholders’ best interests. 212
Where a transaction is not achieved by a public auction, the board
must prove that the process by which the transaction was developed
generated enough information to allow the board to make an informed
decision that the deal was fairly priced and that a better deal was not likely.
This may be accomplished by conducting a private survey of likely
buyers. 213 But, such a survey cannot be unreasonably limited to buyers
favored by management. 214
208. Kahn v. Caporella, No. 13248, 1994 WL 89016, at *5 (Del. Ch. March 10, 1994)
(“Directors who have undertaken the responsibility of selling the corporation must take an
‘active and direct role’ in the process.” (quoting Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instr. Corp.,
569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989))).
209. MacMillan II, 559 A.2d at 1283; see also In re Holly Farms Corp. S’holders Litig.,
No. 10,350, 1988 WL 143010, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988) (finding that the board failed
its Revlon duty to obtain the highest price for shareholders because it negotiated extensively
with one of two bidders but did not make a similar effort to negotiate with the other).
210. See MacMillan II, 559 A.2d at 1283 (finding that the auction was skewed because
one of the bidders had received a tip from someone in the boardroom). The court also found
that the investment banker who was conducting the auction on behalf of the company had
provided more complete information to the favored bidder and had failed to disabuse the
disfavored bidder of the false impression that his was the top bid. Id.
211. See In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 10, 389, 1989 WL 7036 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 31, 1989) (finding enough evidence that the board did not seek an additional round of
bids because it reasonably believed that an additional round would cause one of the bidders
would withdraw and leave only one remaining bidder).
212. Id.; see also Gilbert v. El Paso Co., Nos. 7075, 7079, and 7078, 1988 WL 124325,
at *11-12 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1988) (holding that the board acted reasonably in accepting a
bid at a price it had previously rejected because in the intervening the board had been unable
to find a higher bid).
213. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1287.
214. In re Netsmart Tech, Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007) provides
an example. The independent and disinterested members of Netsmart’s board approved the
sale of the company after considering proposals from several private equity groups. But, the
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Not all circumstances require an auction or a pre-signing market
survey. Where directors have sufficient knowledge to make an informed
decision regarding the fairness of the proposed transaction, they may
properly agree to sell the company without conducting a pre-deal survey of
the market for other potential bidders. 215 A decision to approve the sale of
the company without having first canvassed the market can also be justified
when the circumstances are such that a market survey or an auction was
unnecessary 216 or might have diminished the value of the company. 217
board had not authorized its representatives to solicit offers from companies who were in the
same or related line of business. The court faulted this decision because it believed such
companies might have paid a premium price for the company because the acquisition might
have given the acquirer a competitive advantage in the marketplace. The court held that the
board’s decision to exclude such buyers was inconsistent with its Revlon Duties. Id. at 199.
215. In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 706 (Del. Ch. 2001)
provides an example. The directors of Pennaco approved the sale of the company after
negotiating with only one bidder. The board’s conduct was deemed to be less than
exemplary, but it nonetheless satisfied their fiduciary duties because the company had
received no other offers even though it was closely followed by financial analysts and was
generally known to be open to acquisition. The board also was closely involved in the
company’s activities and was in a position knowledgeably evaluating the adequacy of the
price. See also In re KDI Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 10,278, 1988 WL 116448 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 1, 1988) (not requiring a bidding contest or active market survey).
216. The sale of Lear Corporation provides an example. Lear, 926 A.2d at 115-16. The
board of Lear approved an all-cash merger with a private equity fund headed by Carl Icahn
without having publicly announced that the corporation was on the market and without
having conducted a private search for potential buyers. Although the court found this
process was also less than perfect (it had been negotiated by the company’s CEO whose
stock options would be accelerated by a sale of the company), it rejected the plaintiffs’
Revlon claims because it found that the circumstances supported the conclusion that such
procedures were unnecessary. The court found as a matter of fact that knowledgeable
participants in the mergers and acquisition market would have known that a sale of the
company was likely because Mr. Icahn, a person with a reputation for precipitating valuemaximizing transactions, had purchased a large block of the company’s shares and the
company had announced that it would not use a poison pill, except in very limited
circumstances
217. The sale of Topps Co. provides an example of a circumstance in which a public
offer might have harmed the company. In re Topps S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 85 (Del.
Ch. 2007). In Topps, the corporation’s financial performance during the preceding five
years had been poor. The company had tried, without success, to auction one of its two
lines of business. An insurgent stockholder group had begun a well publicized threat to
launch a proxy contest aimed at taking control and forcing a sale of the company through a
public auction. Against this background, a private equity fund headed by Michael Eisner
began discussions with Topps’ senior managers and eventually reached an agreement by
which the Eisner group would acquire the company through a merger at $9.75 per share.
The court held that Topps’ decision not to conduct a pre-signing market check was
reasonable because these circumstances made it obvious to participants in the financial
markets that Topps needed to do a deal. Id. at 85. The court also held that the incumbent
directors’ decision not to hold a public auction was reasonable because a failed auction, on
the heels of the company’s failed effort to sell one of its divisions, might have diminished
the value of the company. Id. at 84-85.
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Post-Signing: Absence of a Better Deal

In a Revlon situation, directors have an ongoing duty to achieve the
best available price for stockholders, and even in a non-change-of-control
stock-swap they must remain free to deal with offers that may arise after
the transaction is announced. 218 Accordingly, the public announcement
that a company has approved a transaction governed by Revlon opens the
door to others who wish to acquire the company and are willing to make a
superior offer. 219 The announcement of the pending deal can also give
potential bidders enough confidence in the value of the company to
encourage them to make a superior offer. 220 Therefore, all transactions
undergo what amounts to a de facto post-signing “market check.”
When a board faces a Revlon claim, it can argue that the absence of a
superior bid following the announcement of the challenged agreement
tends to prove that the deal approved by the board achieved the highest
available price and thus satisfied the board’s Revlon duties. 221 This
argument can be especially cogent when the challenged transaction is with
a financial buyer and no strategic buyer, who would presumably be in a
position to offer a higher price because it might be able to achieve unique
economies of scale and synergies, submits a competing proposal. 222 This
defense presents a question: Does the absence of a topping offer a
reflection of the strength of the pending deal’s price or the strength of its
deal protection measures?
The litigation involving Lear Corporation provides an example. 223
The board argued that the absence of a superior offer showed that it had
achieved the best available deal. But, the merger agreement by which the
218. ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 108 (Del. Ch. 1999).
219. Lear, 926 A.2d at 122. This is because the board’s fiduciary duties under Revlon
require it to maximize stockholder value. This duty requires it to consider a superior
proposal and accept a bone fide superior offer.
220. Topps, 926 A.2d at 87.
221. In re Formica Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 10,598, 1989 WL 25812, at *12 (Del. Ch.
March 22, 1989); In re Envirodine Indus. S’holders Litig, No. 10,702, 1989 WL 40792, at
*4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 1989). But, the presence of deal protection measures in the merger
agreement creates a question as to whether the absence of topping bids is attributable to the
deal’s high price or the strength of its deal protection measures. Thus, to conclude that the
directors achieved the best reasonably available value the court must determine that deal
protection measures did not create an unreasonable obstacle to other bidders.
222. Lear, 926 A.2d at 122. Topps provides an illustration of this. The board agreed to
sell the company to a private equity firm. When the transaction was announced, the
company’s primary competitor sought to make a higher offer. Topps, 926 A.2d at 62.
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003), provides another
example. In Omnicare, three companies competed in the same industry. When it became
apparent that two were going to merge, the third intervened with a superior offer. Id. at 92027.
223. Lear, 926 A.2d at 107, 119.
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buyer would acquire the corporation included a two-tiered termination fee
payable if Lear accepted a superior proposal. 224 The issue was whether the
termination fee had prevented others from making a superior offer. The
court concluded that the termination fee (2.4% of enterprise value) was
“hardly of the magnitude that should deter a serious rival bid.” 225 In
upholding the effectiveness of Lear’s post-signing market check, the court
noted that others would not be deterred from submitting superior proposals
because the purchaser, Mr. Icahn, had a reputation for “happily stepping
aside and cashing in his equity stake at a substantial profit when other
Also, Mr. Icahn had
bidders submit more attractive offers.” 226
contractually bound himself to vote his shares in favor of a deal approved
by the company’s board. 227
Topps provides another example. Topps had received an unsolicited
expression of interest from Upper Deck, its chief competitor while it was
negotiating a deal with by a private equity fund headed by Michael Eisner.
The Topps board approved the deal with the Eisner group without pursuing
the Upper Deck proposal. The merger agreement allowed a forty-day
period after the deal was announced during which the Topps board could
seek better bids. 228 When that period expired the agreement allowed the
board to accept an unsolicited bid if it was superior to the deal with the
Eisner group. 229 The agreement included deal protection measures, but the
court held that the advantage they gave to the Eisner group was not
unreasonable. 230 Because these provisions would allow Upper Deck to
make a superior offer if it wished to, the court concluded that the board’s

224. The termination fee was coordinated with a “Go-Shop” provision that allowed Lear
45 days to seek a superior offer. In re Lear, 926 A.2d 94 at 107, 119. At the end of the
“Go-Shop” period, the board could still exercise its fiduciary out and accept a superior offer.
If Lear produced a superior offer within the 45 day “Go-Shop” period, the termination fee
would be about 2.8 % of the equity value (1.9% of the enterprise value) of the pending
transaction, but in the more likely event that a prospective purchaser would be unable to
accomplish the due-diligence required to make a superior offer within this relatively short
period of time, the bidder would still be able to make an unsolicited offer, but in that event
the termination fee would rise to 3.5% of the equity value (2.4% of the enterprise value). Id.
at 107, 120.
225. Id. at 120. The merger agreement also gave the buyer the right to match any
superior offer. The court also approved this provision, noting that matching rights are
common and do not deter determined potential buyers.
226. Id. at 121.
227. Id.
228. Topps, 926 A.2d at 86 (noting that forty days was just barely long enough).
229. Id.
230. Id. These deal protection measures allowed the Eisner group to match competing
bids and allowed the Eisner group a termination fee and expense reimbursement if the
company pursued another deal. Id. The court said these were a common provision in
merger agreements and did not create a preclusive obstacle. Id. Indeed, they did not prevent
Upper Deck from making a topping offer.
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decision to sign with the Eisner group was reasonable. 231
3.

Post-Signing: A Better Deal Appears

If a board receives a higher priced offer before an approved business
combination has closed, the board’s duty of loyalty to the stockholders
prevents it from blocking shareholders’ access to the better offer. 232 The
board must also act reasonably to accommodate the needs of a bidder who
is likely to make a superior offer. In the Topps case, during the forty-day
period when Topps could consider other deals, the company’s chief
competitor, Upper Deck, made a proposal to purchase Topps at a higher
price. The court found that the Topps board breached its Revlon duty
because it failed to accommodate Upper Deck’s need for additional
information that would have allowed it to make a potentially superior
offer. 233 In the court’s view, the board seemed to be more interested in
placing obstacles in the way of Upper Deck’s higher-priced offer than in
seeking the best price for stockholders. The court also noted that the
board’s actions tended to favor the bidder who “had pledged to retain
management.” 234
4.

Conclusion: Mere Negligence Violates Duty of Care

In claims for injunctive relief, judicial analysis of the directors’
decisions regarding the corporation’s efforts to enter into a business
combination involves a highly nuanced assessment of the market for
corporate control, the availability of financing, the needs and expectations
of various types of potential buyers, the needs of the corporation, “signals”
sent and received by market participants, and the board’s reaction to these
multiple and often ambiguous factors. Such an analysis clearly goes
beyond the crude level of review required to find “gross negligence.” In
none of these cases does the court find that the directors acted with gross
negligence. Rather, in all of them it examines the “reasonableness” of their
efforts to achieve the best deal for stockholders. Thus, in the context of a
claim for injunctive relief, the court has adopted what amounts to a
231. Id. The court also noted that Topps had a rational reason to be suspicious of Upper
Deck’s motives and that Upper Deck was cherry picking. Id. It only wanted the
Entertainment division which would have left Topps with its foundering Confectionary
business which it had already tried and failed to sell. Id.
232. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185.
233. See Topps, 926 A.2d at 91-92. The court held that the board’s decision to not
declare that Upper Deck’s bid would qualify for continued negotiation after the forty day
go-shop period was unreasonable. And, the board’s reliance on the terms of the Upper Deck
standstill agreement is misplaced. Id. at 88.
234. Id. at 88.
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negligence standard by which to judge the duty of care.
B.

Reasonableness of the Board’s Decision

Proof that the board followed a reasonable decision-making process is
not enough to satisfy enhanced scrutiny. Although a decision by an
independent and careful board would be entitled to judicial deference under
the business judgment rule, enhanced scrutiny requires the court to review
the merits of the challenged decision to see if it is within a range of
reasonable choices. This aspect of enhanced scrutiny not only violates the
business judgment rule’s policy against judicial second-guessing, it also
creates the possibility that the court may venture beyond its jurisdiction.
The Delaware Court of Chancery is a court of equity, as is the
Delaware Supreme Court when it considers appeals from the Court of
Chancery. A court of equity has the power to provide an equitable remedy
for breach of fiduciary duty or for violation of law. But, in the absence of a
violation of law or a breach of fiduciary duty, the court does not have the
power to enjoin or invalidate a transaction, or grant other types of remedy.
Quite simply, in the absence of a wrong, there is nothing to remediate.
The court’s review of a business decision is limited to determining
whether the directors satisfied their duties of loyalty and care. 235 When a
court is called on to give enhanced scrutiny to a transaction that has been
approved by disinterested and independent directors, the usual concerns
that implicate a breach of the duty of loyalty are not present. And, once the
directors have satisfied the first prong of the enhanced scrutiny test by
proving that they followed a reasonable decision-making process, the duty
of care is no longer in issue. Thus, the second prong of the test requires the
court to assess the reasonableness of a business decision made by
independent, disinterested, and careful directors. This invitation to engage
in second-guessing creates the possibility that a court might enjoin or
invalidate a transaction untainted by breach of fiduciary duty merely
because the court did not find the directors’ decisions to be reasonable. 236
On the other hand, the inquiry into the reasonableness of the directors’
235. See discussion infra Part III for a discussion of the business judgment rule.
236. Furthermore, the contract rights of third parties must also be taken into account.
The Delaware courts have held that a contract that requires directors to breach their
fiduciary duties is invalid and unenforceable. See ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d
95, 104 (Del. Ch. 1999) (noting that Delaware will nullify the contractual rights of a suitor
where the contract impinges on the board’s ability to exercise its fiduciary obligations to
shareholders); see also Regan, supra note 125, at 1. The rights of a third party to enforce an
agreement, or particular terms within an agreement—the approval of which is tainted by
breach of fiduciary duty—are subordinated to the rights of stockholders to a remedy for that
breach of duty. QVC, 637 A.2d at 51. But, what about the rights of a third party when the
court enjoins the contract because it disagrees with the reasonableness of the contract terms?
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decision can be justified by the need to confirm that the decision was made
in “good faith.”
C.

Good Faith

Good faith is part of the duty of loyalty. 237 In the context of a business
combination, the duty of loyalty requires directors to base their decisions
on a good faith belief that their decisions will serve the best interests of the
stockholders. Those interests are served by achieving a transaction that
will maximize the value of their shares. The second prong of the enhanced
scrutiny test requires the court to determine whether the board’s decisions
regarding the process leading to the transaction and the decision to approve
the transaction were within a range of choices that would be reasonable in
the circumstances. In this context, the reasonableness of the board’s
decisions would be measured by whether they are likely to achieve the
objective of maximizing the value of the stockholders’ shares. A decision
that is likely to achieve that objective would be reasonable. A decision that
is not likely to achieve that objective would not be reasonable.
If one assumes that a person intends to achieve the likely
consequences of his actions, it follows that the motive for pursuing a
particular course of action can be inferred from its probable result. Thus, a
court can infer that a board’s decision to pursue a course of action that is
reasonably likely to achieve a value maximizing transaction was motivated
by a good faith belief that those actions would achieve precisely that result.
On the other hand, a court can also infer that a board’s decision to approve
a course of action that is not reasonably likely to lead to a value
maximizing transaction was not motivated by a good faith belief that those
actions would maximize value.
Thus, the court’s review of the
reasonableness of the board’s decision provides a way to determine
whether the directors were motivated by a good faith belief that they were
serving the best interests of stockholders. A court can reasonably conclude
that a decision, not within the range of choices that would be likely to
maximize shareholder value, was probably not intended to serve
stockholders’ best interests and thus was inconsistent with the directors’
duty of loyalty.
Independent, disinterested directors are presumed to have acted in
good faith. Before the court can inquire into the reasonableness of their
decision, the plaintiff must produce evidence that establishes reason to
For example, independent,
question the directors’ good faith. 238
237. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
238. The plaintiff has the burden of rebutting the presumption that careful and
disinterested directors acted in good faith. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (2000).
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disinterested directors who have followed a reasonable decision-making
process may, at the end of the process, decide to reject an apparently more
valuable offer in favor of an apparently inferior offer tendered by a bidder
who has promised to employ the company’s senior managers in similar
positions at similar salaries. 239 These facts raise a question regarding the
directors’ good faith. 240 Did the directors really believe, in good faith, that
the less valuable deal was in the stockholders’ best interests, or did they
allow their desire to help senior managers to remain in office to unduly
influence their decision? The possible inference that the directors might
have favored the interests of the managers over the interests of the
stockholders is sufficient to require the directors to justify their actions by
showing that, despite the apparent disparity in price, their decision was
reasonable in the circumstances. If the directors can not satisfy this proof,
the inference that the decision was not made in good faith stands and a
violation of the duty of loyalty has been established.
This mode of thinking seems to have influenced the Court of
Chancery in two recent decisions. In Topps, the court held that the board’s
unwillingness to cooperate with a prospective bidder, who would have paid
a higher price, might have been influenced by the favored bidder’s promise
to preserve the jobs of senior corporate managers. Similarly, in Netsmart,
the facts suggest that the board’s decision to seek bids exclusively from
financial buyers and to exclude strategic buyers from the pool of potential
purchasers might have been explained by the financial buyers’ need to
retain existing management to run the company and the strategic buyers’
probable inclination to fire existing management to use its own managers to
run the combined company. 241
The second prong of enhanced scrutiny is only appropriate where the
facts establish a reasonable basis to doubt that the board’s decisions
regarding the challenged transaction were based on a good faith belief that
they would serve the best interest of stockholders. In the absence of such
239. See Citron v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 1988 WL 53322, at *16
(Del.Ch. 1988), aff’d 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989) (noting, by way of example, that a lack of
good faith can be shown where “an apparently disinterested board makes a judgment that is
essentially inexplicable except on the basis of an otherwise unproven inappropriate
motive—such as personal favoritism or antipathy. Such a case might arise, for example,
where an apparently disinterested board rejects a higher bid in favor of a lower one, on the
same terms”).
240. If the jobs at issue belong to the directors themselves, the analysis is much more
straightforward. The directors have a direct self-interest in protecting their jobs. Under the
traditional business judgment rule, the directors would have to prove the entire fairness of
their decision.
241. 924 A.2d at 198-99 (noting that management favored pursuing a private equity deal
that would preserve their jobs as opposed to strategic deals that would likely lead to the
termination of their employment, and disavowing the obvious implication that the board had
“consciously pursued objectives at odds with getting the best price”).
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facts, the presumption that independent, disinterested directors acted in
good faith stands, and the court should not second-guess the board’s
decisions. In the absence of a violation of law or a breach of fiduciary
duty, the court is without power to invalidate the challenged transaction.
An inquiry into the reasonableness of the transaction in the absence of a
breach of duty creates the possibility that the court may take action that
exceeds its power.
VI. NO ENHANCED SCRUTINY OF CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES
When a plaintiff challenges a decision to approve a business
combination after the deal has closed, equitable remedies are no longer
available. It is too late for injunctive relief, and rescission is not available
because, as a practical matter, a completed merger cannot generally be
unwound. 242 Accordingly, the plaintiff is left with only a claim to recover
financial damages from the directors who allegedly breached their fiduciary
duties when they approved the transaction. 243
Unlike a claim for injunctive relief, the courts will not allow plaintiffs
who seek to recover financial damages from the directors to simply allege
that the directors did not act in a way that was designed to achieve the best
available price for shareholders. In reviewing claims for damages, the
courts emphasize that Revlon did not create a new duty requiring directors
to seek to get the best available transaction. 244 Rather, Revlon and its
progeny merely recognized that in some circumstances the traditional
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty 245 are to be focused on “a specific
objective: maximizing the sale price of the enterprise.” 246 For this reason,
the courts require plaintiffs who seek to recover damages on a Revlon claim
to “plead sufficient facts to support the underlying claims for a breach of
fiduciary duties in conducting the sale.” 247
A.

Duty of Care Claims
As a practical matter, a claim alleging that the directors’ failure to

242. E.g., Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 603 (Del. Ch. 1974); McMillan v.
Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 500 (Del Ch. 2000); Goodwin v. Live Entm’t, Inc., No.
15,765, 1999 WL 64265, at *6 n.3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 1999); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders
Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 728 (Del. Ch. 1999). In Delaware this amounts to a substantive
principle of law, rather than a finding of fact.
243. McMillan, 768 A.2d at 500.
244. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001).
245. Id.
246. Id.; see also Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182-183, QVC, 637 A.2d at 43-44; Barkan, 567
A.2d at 1286; MacMillan II, 559 A.2d at 1288.
247. Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1084.
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achieve the best available price because they breached their duty of care
will seldom, if ever, support an effort to impose personal financial liability
on the directors. Most, if not all, Delaware corporations include an
exculpation provision in their certificate of incorporation pursuant to
Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. 248 Such a
provision prohibits the imposition of personal liability on directors for
breach of the duty of care. Thus, in the context of a Revlon claim, “if a
board unintentionally fails, as a result of gross negligence and not of bad
faith or self-interest, to follow up on a materially higher bid and an
exculpatory charter provision is in place, then the plaintiff will be barred
from recovery.” 249
There are two important points here. First, as a practical matter, the
prevalence of Section 102(b)(7) exculpation provisions in corporate
charters means there is little likelihood that a court will be called upon to
decide a Revlon claim for damages based on an alleged breach of care.
Second, if there is still a corporation that does not include a Section
102(b)(7) provision in its charter, a Revlon claim for damages based on the
duty of care would require a showing that the directors acted with “gross
negligence.” As a consequence, the usual arguments advanced by plaintiffs
regarding the reasonableness of the process by which the directors
developed the challenged transaction would be unavailing.
B.

Duty of Loyalty Claims

To impose personal liability on directors, a Revlon claim must assert
that the directors’ failure to secure the highest attainable value was the
result of a breach of the duty of loyalty. 250 There are two ways to establish
a breach of the duty of loyalty. The plaintiff may follow the traditional
approach of alleging in the complaint (and proving at trial) that the
directors were under the influence of factors that gave them a personal
incentive not to maximize value. 251 Alternatively, the plaintiff can argue
that the directors’ decision to approve the challenged transaction was not
made in good faith. 252

248. 8 Del. C. §102(b)(7).
249. McMillan, 768 A.2d at 502; see also Goodwin, 1999 WL 64265, at *5-6, *20
(noting that “Goodwin's disclosure, Revlon, and unfair dealing claims will therefore survive
or fail summary judgment depending on the presence or absence of record evidence of bad
faith or disloyalty.”); Lukens, 757 A.2d at 730-32 (dismissing the case because of the
presence of the 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision).
250. Id. at 501.
251. E.g., McMillan, 768 A.2d. at 502; Goodwin, 1999 WL 64265, at *20.
252. McMillan, 768 A.2d at 502.
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Lack of Impartiality

Where the plaintiff alleges that the directors were self-interested or
acting under the influence of a self-interested party, the Revlon analysis
becomes virtually identical to the analysis under the traditional business
judgment rule. 253 In both situations the plaintiff is put to the burden of
pleading and proving facts that create reason to doubt the directors’
impartiality. Under the traditional business judgment rule, when the
plaintiff places the directors’ loyalty in issue by successfully challenging
their impartiality, the burden shifts to the compromised directors to prove
that the transaction was entirely fair to corporation. 254 Under the enhanced
scrutiny standard, proof that the challenged transaction was entirely fair is
not enough to avoid personal liability. Rather, the compromised directors
must prove that the challenged transaction achieved the best available deal
for the stockholders. 255 Depending on the circumstances, proof that a deal
was the “best” may be more difficult than proof that the deal was within a
range of fairness.
But, this is speculation. So far, no case has reached this point. All of
plaintiffs’ efforts to impose personal liability on directors based on Revlon
claims have been dismissed on the pleadings or rejected on motions for
summary judgment, 256 except one.
2.

Lack of Good Faith

That one exception was Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co., 257 a class
action for damages 258 in which the plaintiff alleged that the directors of
Lyondell had not acted in good faith when they approved the sale of the
company. 259 The defendant’s motion for summary judgment was denied
because the record did not rule out the possibility that the process by which
the directors approved the sale was so deficient that it might reflect an
253. See Veasey, supra note 134, at 399 (equating entire fairness with enhanced
scrutiny).
254. See infra Part III for a discussion of a the “entire fairness” standard.
255. Revlon, 526 A.2d at 185.
256. Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1101; McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d 1012, 1032 (Del. Ch.
2004); McMillan, 768 A.2d at 508; In re CompuCom Sys., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 499-N,
2006 WL 2481325, at *11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2005); In re Prime Hospitality, Inc. S’holders
Litig., No. 652-N, 2005 WL 1138738, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005).
257. No. 3176-VCN, 2008 WL 2923427 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2008).
258. In Ryan, the merger had been consummated so equitable remedies were no longer
available. An award of financial damages against the directors was the only remedy still
available to plaintiff. See id. at *11 (noting that plaintiff is only entitled to damages upon a
showing that “the Board either failed to act in good faith in approving the Merger or
otherwise acted disloyally”).
259. Id. at *4
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intentional disregard of their Revlon duties in violation of the good faith
component of their duty of loyalty. 260
Lyondell’s certificate of incorporation included a Section 102(b)(7)
exculpation provision, so the plaintiff was forced to ground his Revlon
claim on a breach of the duty of loyalty. 261 The facts did not support any of
the traditional approaches to establishing a duty of loyalty claim. 262
Instead, the plaintiff argued that the directors’ failure to take more
aggressive steps toward the pursuit of the best available transaction and
their willingness to accept certain deal protective measures reflected an
Such intentional
intentional disregarded of their Revlon duties. 263
dereliction of duty, the plaintiff argued, constituted bad faith 264 which
constituted a violation of the duty of loyalty. 265
The court accepted the plaintiff’s argument. It held that the record
could reasonably support the inference that (1) the directors’ failure to
attempt to negotiate a better deal, 266 (2) their failure to do a pre-signing
market survey, 267 and (3) their failure to do an adequate post-signing
market check 268 reflected their conscious disregard of their duties under the
Revlon doctrine. 269
The defendants sought leave to file an interlocutory appeal from the
trial court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment. The trial court
denied that request, 270 but the Delaware Supreme Court, in an unusual
260. Id. at *11, *18-19. The board had not participated in the negotiations regarding
price. Ryan, at *4. Price had been negotiated by the company’s CEO. Id. The board
signed the agreement six days later, after having received advice from independent financial
advisors. Id. at *1. The board did not do a pre-signing market survey, and the post-signing
market check was arguably inhibited by deal protection measures in the merger agreement.
Id.
261. Id. at *11.
262. Only one of the eleven directors, the CEO, was employed by the company. Id. at *4
(identifying the ten independent directors and the eleventh member who was the CEO). The
other ten were outsiders with no conflicting self-interest. Id. at *10 - *11. Their
independence from the proponents of the transaction was beyond challenge. See id. at *10
n.59 (summary judgment was granted against plaintiff on all general duty of loyalty
claims). In fact, the court acknowledged they were “well-credentialed, independent
directors.” Id. at *4.
263. Id. at *11 - *13 (discussing cases applying Revlon).
264. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 -66 (Del. 2006) (holding
that “intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities”
constitutes bad faith for which exculpation from personal liability is not available).
265. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (holding that a bad faith violates the
duty of loyalty).
266. Id. at *14.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176-VCN 2008 WL 4174038 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 29, 2008).
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exercise of its discretion, agreed to hear the appeal. 271 Then, in an en banc
decision, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and
remanded with directions that summary judgment be entered in favor of the
defendants. 272
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the directors’ duty of loyalty
required them to perform their decision-making function in good faith.273
The court also acknowledged that an intentional dereliction of a known
duty would reflect an absence of the good faith which would constitute a
violation the duty of loyalty. 274 But, it found that the trial court’s
application of these principles to the facts presented by the plaintiff’s case
was flawed. The process by which the Lyondell board reached its decision
to approve the sale of the company might have been imperfect, but these
They did not
imperfections implicated only the duty of care. 275
demonstrate an intentional dereliction of the board’s Revlon duties.
The Supreme Court explained that trial court’s analysis erred because
it was based on the view that Revlon and its prodigy had defined particular
ways in which a board must perform its Revlon duties. 276 In rejecting that
view, the Supreme Court held that “[t]here is only one Revlon duty–to
‘[get] the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.’” 277 It
explained that “there is no single bluepring that a board must follow to
fulfill its [Revlon] duties.” 278 Accordingly, “[n]o court can tell directors
exactly how to accomplish that goal, because they will be facing a unique
combination of circumstances, many of which will be outside their
control.” 279
Here, the directors’ failure to conduct an auction, or to conduct a presigning market check might implicate the duty of care, 280 but “there is a
vast difference between an inadequate or flawed effort to carry out

271. Lyondell Chem. Co v. Ryan, No. 401, 2008, 2008 WL 4294938 (Del. Sept. 15,
2008).
272. Id.
273. Id. at *3 (discussing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006)).
274. Id. at *4 (discussing Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006)).
275. Id. at *6
276. Id. at *6 (holding that the trial court’s conclusion that the directors must follow one
of several course of action was erroneous), and at *7 (explaining that the trial court’s
decision was based on the incorrect view that Revlon required directors to follow one of
three courses of action: an auction, a pre-signing market survey, or market research that
provides a precise knowledge of the company’s value).
277. Id. (quoting Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.)
278. Id. at *6 (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del.
1989)).
279. Id. at *6.
280. Id. at *6-*7.
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fiduciary duties and a conscious disregard for those duties.” 281 Only a
complete and utter failure to make an effort to confirm that the deal under
consideration represents the best reasonably available price would
implicate the kind of bad faith that would constitute a breach of the duty of
loyalty. 282
Thus, it would take an extreme, and highly unlikely, set of facts to
support a loyalty claim based on a board’s failure to perform its Revlon
duties. 283 Accordingly, it appears that independent and disinterested
directors who make a good faith effort to comply with their Revlon duties
are extremely unlikely to be held personally liability on a claim that they
failed to achieve the best available price.
This makes sense. If it were otherwise, independent, disinterested
directors would face personal liability if a trial court, with the benefit of
hindsight, were to disagree with their strategic decisions regarding the
process by which they sold their company. Moreover, the exposure they
would face would be greater than that faced by directors who engage in
self-dealing. A self-interested director can escape liability by showing that
the self-interested transaction was accomplished at a fair price. 284 But in
the Revlon context, the fact that the transactional price was merely fair
would not be a defense. 285 To avoid liability in the Revlon context
directors would have to prove that they achieved the “best” reasonably
available price. 286 If they failed to do so, they would be personally liable
for the difference between the value of the deal they accepted and the value
of a hypothetical deal that the court, with the benefit of hindsight, believes
they should have achieved.
The astonishing inequity of that result explains why it would take a
truly extreme set of facts to establish a disregard of Revlon duties that was
sufficiently egregious to justify the imposition of personal liability on the
independent directors who approved the sale.

281. Id. at *7.
282. Id. (noting that only a knowing and complete failure to undertake their
responsibilities would be a breach of the duty of loyalty).
283. Id. (citing In re Lear Corp. S’holders Litig., 2008 WL 4053221 (Del. Ch. 2008)for
the proposition that it would take an extreme set of circumstances to establish a dereliction
of duty in the transactional context).
284. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993)(holding that self-interested
directors were not liable for approving a compensation plan that was entirely fair).
285. In the Ryan case, the trial court’s finding that the merger was accomplished at an
“undeniably” fair price.285 Ryan at *23.
286. The Revlon Doctrine requires the board to seek the best available price. See infra
notes 29-129 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
A.

Focus and Definition of the Board’s Duty

The nature of the transaction should determine whether the board’s
fiduciary duties are focused primarily on the corporation or the welfare of
the stockholders. A transaction that involves enterprise issues requires the
board to focus on the best interests of the corporation. A transaction that
involves ownership issues, matters that will affect the stockholders’
ownership of the corporation’s shares, requires the board to focus on the
best interest of the stockholders. A business combination will necessarily
affect the stockholders’ ownership in the corporation because it will
convert their shares into cash, debt securities, or shares of the combined
business entity.
In negotiating the terms of a business combination, the board is, in
effect, acting as an agent on behalf of the stockholders. It is a basic
principle of agency law that an agent owes its principal fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care when the agent acts on behalf of the principal. Thus, in the
context of a business combination, the board’s duty of loyalty is owed to
the stockholders. This duty requires the board to focus its actions and
decisions on the stockholders’ best interests. These interests require the
board to seek to achieve the best available deal.
What constitutes the best available deal is also resolved by the nature
of the transaction under consideration. A cash-for-stock transaction
amounts to a sale of the shareholders’ ownership of the corporation in
exchange for cash. It terminates the stockholders’ equity participation in
the enterprise. It represents the stockholders’ last opportunity to profit
from their investment in the corporation. These facts mean that the
directors’ duty to serve the stockholders’ best interests is defined in terms
of achieving the highest available price for the shares. If a superior
transaction should appear, the board’s duty to stockholders would prevent
the board from denying the stockholders access to the superior deal.
In a stock-swap business combination, the board is negotiating a deal
that will change the nature of its stockholders’ investment, but it will not
terminate their equity participation as owners of the on-going enterprise.
The stockholders’ shares of their corporation will be converted to shares of
the combined business entity, a larger entity with more shareholders. In
deciding to approve such a transaction, the board must reasonably believe
that the stockholders of their corporation will be better off as stockholders
of the combined corporation. This conclusion has two aspects, one longterm and one short-term. First, the board must determine that the long-term
prospects of the resulting corporation are better than those of the
corporation in which the stockholders presently hold stock. If not, there is

570

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:3

no reason to do the deal. Second, the board must assure that the exchange
ratio fairly reflects the value of their corporation’s contribution to the
resulting corporation. If a stock-swap merger also happens to involve a
change of control, the board is negotiating the terms under which its
stockholders lose voting control of the corporation. This means there is a
separate element of value to be sought in the negotiation—a control
premium.
Change of control is irrelevant to the problem of defining the board’s
duty when a third party makes an arguably more valuable offer for the
company’s shares. The fact that the pending transaction does not involve a
change of control should not allow the board to proceed with a less
valuable transaction and deny the stockholders the opportunity to accept
the more valuable offer. By the same token, the fact that a pending offer
will result in a change of control, should not require the board to abandon a
pending transaction to allow the stockholders to accept an all cash offer. In
both instances the board’s duty is defined by the fact that the transaction
requires the board to function as an agent for the stockholders. Its fiduciary
duty as an agent requires that it pursue the course of action that will best
serve the stockholders’ interests. If the board believes in good faith that the
stockholders will be better off as equity participants in the long-term
prospects of the combined business entity, it may proceed with the pending
transaction. But, if the board believes that the alternative transaction
promises more value for the stockholders, it must abandon the pending deal
and allow stockholders to pursue the alternative transaction.
B.

Standard of Review

The Delaware courts’ overuse of enhanced scrutiny has led to judicial
second guessing of business decisions made by disinterested, independent
and diligent directors whose decisions would ordinarily be entitled to
judicial deference. As a result, when an intervening transaction becomes
available and the inevitable litigation ensues, the final decision as to the
sale of the company is made by the court. But such decisions should be
made in the boardroom; not the courtroom.
Assuming the absence of facts that give reason to doubt the board’s
impartiality or that show breach of the duty of care, enhanced scrutiny
should apply only where the circumstances surrounding the board’s
approval of the challenged business combination suggest that the board’s
decision may not have been based on a good faith belief that it would serve
the stockholders’ best interests.
The specter that directors’ decisions might be motivated by factors
irrelevant to their duty to the stockholders is raised when the circumstances
suggest that the directors may have had an ulterior purpose. Enhanced
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scrutiny should be used only where necessary to resolve ambiguity
regarding the directors’ motives. For example, a board’s decision to defend
its corporation against a hostile takeover may have been motivated by a
desire to protect the corporation from reasonably perceived harm, but it
may also have been motivated by the directors’ desire to retain their
corporate offices. It was to resolve this type of ambiguity that the Supreme
Court created the where the circumstances suggest that the board may have
had ulterior motives for approving the sale of the company to a particular
buyer, enhanced scrutiny is appropriate to allow the directors concept of
enhanced scrutiny in the Unocal 287 decision. Enhanced scrutiny meant that
the directors whose motives were in doubt would be required to prove that
they reasonably believed the takeover threatened the stockholders and they
took reasonable action to neutralize that threat. 288 Similarly, in the context
of a decision to approve a business combination between corporations to
remove the question as to their good faith by showing that they followed a
process that they believed was reasonably likely to achieve the best deal for
the stockholders, and that the transaction they approved was a reasonable
way to accomplish that objective.
For example, a decision that was apparently motivated by a desire to
preserve the jobs of managers should be subject to enhanced scrutiny.
Thus, enhanced scrutiny is proper to review a board’s decision to limit the
field of prospective purchasers to those who would be likely to retain the
company’s managers, 289 as well as where the board’s decision to reject a
potentially more valuable offer could be explained by a belief that the
favored purchaser intended to retain the company’s managers. 290 In both
instances, the board’s failure to show that its decision in these particular
circumstances would support the conclusion that the decision was not
based on a good faith belief that it would serve the best interests of
stockholders and thus constituted a violation of the duty of loyalty.
This approach is consistent with the results reached in the cases which
have granted injunctive relief: MacMillan 291 (self-interest and corrupt
auction), QVC 292 (favoring bidder who would retain the target company’s
CEO as the CEO of the surviving entity), Netsmart 293 (limiting search to
financial buyers who would retain management), Topps 294 (favoring bidder
287. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
288. Id. at 955 (stating “[the directors] satisfy that burden by showing good faith and
reasonable investigation”).
289. See Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 171 (discussing how the board failed to take reasonable
steps to seek out strategic buyers).
290. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173; Topps, 926 A.2d at 58.
291. Macmillan II, 559 A.2d at 1264.
292. QVC, 637 A.2d at 1251.
293. Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 176.
294. Topps, 926 A.2d at 61.
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who was likely to retain management). It is different from the approach
taken by the court in the anomalous case of Ryan. 295 In that case the court
found that the procedures followed by the board in its effort to sell the
company were so inconsistent with the teachings of Revlon and its progeny,
that it could be construed to reflect bad faith. 296 But, procedure is a
component of the duty of care, and the court has held in Disney that a
breach of the duty of care does not support a claim for bad faith unless it is
also an intentional disregard of the duty of care which is bad faith. 297
The approach advocated in this paper would limit the concept of good
faith to an analysis of the claims based on a duty of loyalty. That duty
requires the directors to base their decisions and actions on a good faith
belief that they will serve the best interests of the beneficiary of the
fiduciary duty. By limiting enhanced scrutiny to circumstances that clearly
implicate a potential breach of the duty of loyalty, the court would avoid
the possibility of exceeding its power by granting a remedy where there is
no breach of duty.
By restoring the business judgment rule to judicial review of business
combinations, Delaware will return to basic principles. No longer will
judges second guess business decisions made in good faith by independent,
disinterested, and diligent directors. No longer will the final decision
regarding the sale of a company be made by chancellors. Instead, it will be
made by the directors elected by the stockholders to make such decisions.
At this point it is useful to remember that enhanced scrutiny is
performed in an environment where the business judgment rule’s
presumption that the directors’ disinterestedness, independence, and
diligence stands un-rebutted. If it were not so, the transaction would be
reviewed under the more rigorous entire fairness standard. Thus, enhanced
scrutiny is performed under circumstances in which the directors’ decision
would ordinarily be entitled to judicial deference.

295. Ryan, 2008 WL 2923427, at *1.
296. Id.
297. Disney, 906 A.2d at 67; see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)
(explaining that the obligation to act in good faith is part of the duty of loyalty).

